























A. CONCEPT OF BLOCKADE 
Whereas the law of contraband regulates the extent to which a belligerent 
can prevent an enemy from receiving goods useful in the conduct o{ war, the 
law of blockade deals with the belligerent right-and lin1its thereto-to 
prevent the vessels (and aircraft) of all states from entering and leaving 
either the whole or a part of an enemy's coast. 1 
In its origin,2 blockade was conc~ived as a measure analogous to that of 
siege in land warfare, and the attempt to bar the sea approaches to an 
enemy port was considered legitimate only when carried out in conjunction 
with military operations on land. Even when dissociated from siege by 
land blockade remained a measure designed to reduce certain ports of an 
enemy into submission through .. investment by sea." In the pursuit of 
this objective a belligerent was considered as justified in prohibiting all 
neutral intercourse with the besieged or blocked up port. However, 
during the course of the nineteenth century the practice arose of using a 
blockade principally to cut off an enemy's sea-borne trade, and thereby to 
deprive him of the resources for waging war, rather than simply to force 
1 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 632.a.-This, at least, represents the traditional concept of 
blockade, though it must be added that in the light of recent developments-to be reviewed 
shortly-blockade is now frequently considered to relate as well to the belligerent right to 
prevent the cargoes of vessels and aircraft from reaching the blockaded area whatever the route 
and method of conveyance. On the issues to which this extended concept of blockade gives 
rise, see pp. 3ro-r2., 316-q.-In the following pages attention will be directed to the problem 
of blockades by sea. The extension of blockades to include the air space over the high seas 
remains a development for the future. It is next to impossible to declare with any degree 
of assurance what procedures may govern blockade by air. Certainly, there are grave diffi-
culties in assuming that the practices of naval blockade can be applied readily, by analogy, 
to aerial blockades. 
2 "In its origin,"' implying when once conceived as a distinct and separate measure of naval 
warfare. Prior to such emergence it was, as Jessup and Deak point out, "closely tied up with 
contraband. The common root from which both doctrines sprang is the total prohibition 
of commerce with an enemy. This type of belligerent pretension was much in vogue from very 
early times, still flourishing in the early seventeenth century, and has reappeared in various 
guises at intervals ever since. In the face of neutral protests, and the growing strength of the 
law of neutral rights in general, the belligerents receded from their insistence on total prohibi· 
dons by two types of compromise or concession, one geographical and the other categorical; 
geographically, the ban, instead of extending to the entire country of the enemy, was confined 
to certain ports which were besieged or blocked up; categorically, the ban was limited to certain 
categories of goods such as arms and munitions which came to be known as contraband of war." 
The Origins (Vol. I~ Neutrality, Its History, Economics and Law, 1935), p. 104. 
283 
hin1 to abandon further military resistance in a limited area. At the time, 
opposition to the developing practice of so-called ' 'commercial'' blockades 
was considerable, and even today it has not entirely disappeared. The 
basis for opposition can be attributed largely to the conviction that in this 
development the original purpose-and hence the justification-of blockade 
had been abandoned; that from a military measure designed to pennit bellig-
erents to conduct effective siege by sea, unimpeded by neutral efforts to 
relieve an enemy made the object of attack> blockade had become a measure 
whose significance was economic rather than military. As such it was 
questioned, if only from the conviction that an enemy's economy could not 
of itself form a legitimate military objective, particularly if this implied 
striking at an opponent primarily through action immediately directed 
against neutral trade. 3 
Nevertheless, the attitude and practice of states during the half century 
preceding World War I provided little support for this opinion. The 1856 
Declaration of Paris had laid down the principle that blockades, in order to 
be binding, must be effectively maintained, but beyond this had furnished 
no indication that commercial blockades were forbidden. Nor did the 
provisions of the 1909 Declaration of London, dealing with blockade, 
contain any stipulation that could be interpreted as limiting this belligerent 
measure to any well-defined purpose. If anything, the period under review 
indicated acceptance of the notion that blockade could serve purposes 
other than the narrowly construed military operation that had provided its 
earlier justification. 
Since 1914 the controversy over the legitimate purposes of a blockade 
has lost its former significance. In both World Wars the belligerents con-
sidered the economy of an enemy not only a legitin1ate, but a principal, 
military objective. "Economic warfare," in the words of the British 
3 Thus John Westlake in an essay written during the period of the American Civil War, 
declared that "commercial blockades ought to be abolished from motives both of justice and ' 
policy." The burden of the argument ran as follows: "A neutral cannot be touched by a 
belligerent unless he has in some way identified himself with the enemy. Actual mixing in 
the hostilities is such an identification, and to relieve a place which is the actual object of at-
tack at the time, whether such attack be conducted only by sea, or by land also, is actually 
to mix in the hostilities; therefore blockade in the case of siege is justifiable. To ship a cargo 
to or from a country with which the shipper is at peace, that cargo being neither contraband 
nor destined for the supply of a besieged place, is neither an actual mixing in the hostilities, 
nor in any way an identification of the shipper with the enemy; therefore blockade except in 
the case of siege is unjustifiable." The Collected Papers of John Westlake On Public International 
Law, pp. 342.-3. Westlake quoted with approval the opinion expressed by the American 
Secretary of State Cass, in r859, that the "blockade of a coast, or of commercial positions along 
it, without any regard to ulterior military operations, and with- the real design of carrying 
on a war against trade, and from its very nature against the trade of peaceful and friendly 
powers, instead of a war against armed men, is a proceeding which is difficult to reconCile 
with reason or with the opinions of modern times." Within four years the American Govern-
ment was to declare one of the most important "commercial blockades" of the nineteenth 
century. 
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Ministry of Economic Warfare, ' 'is a military operation, comparable to 
the operation of the three Services in that its object is the defeat of the 
enemy, and complementary to them in that its function is to deprive the 
enemy of the materialtneans of resistance.'' 4 In warfare at sea the pursuit 
of this objective has led to a determined effort on the part of each bel-
ligerent to achieve the complete economic isolation of an opponent; to 
prevent any imports to or exports from the territory of an enemy. Not 
infrequently the term blockade has been used to indicate this belligerent 
effort. 
This use of the term blockade to comprehend the most varied of bellig-
erent measures designed to cut off the whole of an enemy's sea-borne trade 
undoubtedly has served to introduce an element of ambiguity. In part, so-
called "measures of blockade" came to include those developments in the 
law of contraband that have already received consideration. In part, how-
ever, they referred to actions whose justification was alleged to rest upon 
the right of reprisal, and it is this latter category of measures that will form 
one of the principal concerns of the present chapter. Admittedly, these 
belligerent reprisal measures bear-at best-only a faint resemblance to the 
blockades envisaged by the traditional law. Nor did they conform to the 
customary rules governing blockade, though the degree to which the re-
spective belligerents departed from the customary law varied considerably. 
Nevertheless, it is abundantly clear that these measures of reprisal were in-
tended, in almost every instance, to achieve the purpose of blockade as 
presently conceived. At the same time, the frequency of belligerent 
reprisal measures stands in marked contrast to the disuse into which 
the traditional blockade, conducted in accordance with the customary 
rules governing blockade, has fallen. 5 
The explanation of this seemingly anomalous situation is as easy to dis-
cern as a satisfactory solution is difficult to reach. It is by now a common-
place that the customary rules regulating blockades have been found by 
belligerents to be unduly restrictive-or, more accurately, almost impossi-
ble of application-under modern conditions. The customary law in force 
at the outbreak of World War I was at once the product of, and designed 
to regulate, "in-shore" or "close" blockades-i. e., blockades maintained 
by a line of vessels stationed in the immediate vicinity of the blockaded 
coast. But developments in the weapons of war have made the close 
blockade a feasible operation today only in the most exceptional of circum-
4 Cited in Medlicott, op. cit., p. 17. 
5 During World War I several blockades were imposed which did conform to the customary 
rules, but they were all of distinctly limited importance. These blockades, and the prize 
decisions to which they gave rise, are reviewed by Garner, Prize Law During The World War, 
pp. 62.1-30. During \Vorld War II the Russian declaration of a blockade of the Finnish coast, 
proclaimed in January 1940, furnishes perhaps the only known instance of what was alleged 
to be a blockade in the traditional sense. However, the Soviet Union denied being at war with 
Finland, and the latter asserted that the alleged blockade was completely ineffective. 
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stances. The difficulty, however, has not been that the customary law 
forbade so-called "long-distance" blockades, as such, but that it required 
the latter to conform to rules established for close blockades. And this 
proved to be an impossible task. 
To the foregoing must be added the further consideration that the very 
intensity of the belligerent's desire to effect the complete economic isolation 
of an enemy has been a factor of importance in preventing the adaptation 
of the law governing blockade to changed conditions. For this intense 
desire to cut off the whole of an enemy's sea-borne trade is itself one of the 
changed conditions, along with the changes that have occurred in the 
means for conducting naval hostilities; and it has meant that belligerents 
have been more than content to rest their so-called "blockade" measures 
upon the right of retaliation rather than to insist that this branch of the 
law-as all others-cannot be frozen into a mold no longer suitable to 
modern conditions No doubt it is true that neutral intransigence to change 
has contributed to the belligerent decision to take retaliatory measures 
rather than to argue on behalf of the legitimacy of altering the established 
law. It is equally true, however, that belligerents have not been un-
willing-on the whole-to avoid posing a clear and direct challenge to the 
continued validity of the customary rules governing the operation of block-
ade, and this unwillingness may be attributed largely to the recognition 
that reprisal measures provided the opportunity of pleading for greater 
freedom of action than could reasonably be justified on any other ground&. 6 
6 In a word, reprisal action furnished the pretext for belligerents to claim the right to do 
what they wanted-which in both World Wars was nothing less than the complete stoppage of 
enemy trade with the least possible commitment of surface naval forces-whereas the claim that 
the customary rules were obsolescent under modern conditions probably would have led-at 
best-only to modifications of the traditional law. This is apparent in the case of Germany, 
whose methods of "blockading" Great Britain necessitated not only the abandonment of the 
rules heretofore governing blockade but, in addition, the abandonment of the most fundamental :' 
rules applicable to any form of belligerent interference with neutral trade. On the other hand, 
the case of Great Britain is more complex. It will presently be submitted that at least a very 
large part of the British reprisals system in both World Wars may well be regarded as a reason-
able adaptation of the customary law to changed conditions. At least this is considered true 
with respect to the reprisal Orders in Council of March n, 1915 and November '-7, 1939 (see 
pp. 305-6, 31'1-), and during World War I Great Britain herself so argued (see pp. 3o8-1o). On the 
whole, however, Great Britain sought the method of reprisals and avoided contending for clear 
legal change. Nor does it appear sufficient to explain this behavior by a fear that the British 
Prize Court would have refused to justify action on any other grounds. Instead: Bdtish reluc-
tance to seek the path of legal change may also be attributed to a desire to retain an undefined-
and undefinable-freedom of action, a desire admirably served by the doctrine of reprisals. In · 
this connection, however, it has been observed that: "Both for political and for legal reasons 
it is unfortunate that so important a part of British economic warfare should have so unstable 
a foundation as the doctrine of retaliation. Politically it implies uncertainty, prior to. the 
event, whether the regulations will be introduced." S. W. D. Rowson, "Modern Blockade: 
Some Legal Aspects," B. Y. I. L., '-3 (1946), p. 351· But this "instability" has its virtues 
(from the belligerents point of view), not the least of which is the retention of a "free hand." 




The net result has been a growing tension between the customary law 
and belligerent practice. But to what extent recent belligerent practice, 
though assuming the form of reprisals, may now be regarded as having 
succeeded in replacing the tradi tiona! law assured! y remains an unsettled 
issue. Before turning to this issue it will be useful both to restate in sum-
mary manner the customary law governing blockade and to review the 
various recent measures taken by belligerents which served the purposes of 
blockade, though departing from the rules traditionally governing its 
form and operation. 
B. THE CUSTOMARY RULES GOVERNING BLOCKADE 
I. Establishment and Notification. 
The formal requirements of a blockade concern the manner by which it 
must be established and its existe_nce made known. The authority to 
establish a blockade rests solely with the belligerent government. For 
this reason a declaration of blockade will generally be made direct by the 
blockading state, though it may be made by the naval commander insti-
tuting the blockade, who thereby acts on behalf of his government. In 
either case the necessity for a declaration containing the date a blockade 
will begin, and its geographical limits, is clear. Equally settled is the 
requirement that a belligerent must grant a certain period of grace to neutral 
vessels in order that the latter may be able to leave ports included within 
the blockaded area. 7 
erent (and in a position approximately the same as in the two World Wars). It is equally true 
for future conflicts in which Great Britain may occupy the position of a non-participant. In 
the latter instance, the admittedly vague and controversial character of "reprisal" measures 
bearing upon neutral rights at sea would leave Great Britain free to deny the legitimacy of 
measures analogous to those she herself has resorted to in two wars. 
7 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 632.b.-The length of the period of grace granted neutral 
vessels to leave the blockaded area is dependent-in principle-upon the discretion of the state 
establishing the blockade. The only clear requirement is that allowance must be made for such 
departure.-Distinguish blockades as a regular measure of naval warfare between belligerents 
from so-called "pacific blockades," as well as from the act of a parent state in closing its ports 
during a period of insurrection or "insurgency." The legality of "pacific blockades" is very 
doubtful today in view of the obligations imposed upon states Members of the United Nations. 
In any event, "pacific blockades" are not belligerent measures, but actions directed by one 
state against another with which it is at peace. While involving the ships of the state being 
"blockaded," the vessels of third states cannot be interfered with. At least this has always 
been the position taken by the United States. More disputed is the right of a parent govern-
ment to close waters and ports to the vessels of third states when such waters and ports are 
held by insurgent forces. Although the legal position here is far from clear, it does seem settled 
that acts of closure cannot be made effective by measures which extend beyond territorial waters. 
In the absence of a recognized condition of belligerency neither the parent government nor 
insurgents can exercise belligerent rights against the vessels of third states on the high seas. 
On the other hand, it is generally recognized that: "Within territorial waters both parties may 
prevent supplies from reaching their opponent. This right of barring access gives no authority 
to seize or destroy foreign ships." U. S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, IpJ8, 
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Since knowledge of the existence of a blockade is deemed essential to the 
offenses of breach and attempted breach of blockade, it is customary that 
neutral governn1ents be notified by the blockading state of the establish-
ment of a blockade and that the local authorities within the blockaded 
area receive similar notification from the commander of the blockading 
forces. 8 But although neutral vessels are certainly entitled to notification 
of a blockade before they can be made prize for its attempted breach, it is 
doubtful whether formal notification is required by law. Thus according 
to Anglo-American practice the precise character such notification may 
take is not considered material. 9 
2. ~Jrectivcness 
Once a blockade has been properly declared and its existence made known 
it must satisfy three conditions in order to be considered binding: it must 
be effectively maintained, it must not bar access to neutral ports and coasts, 
and finally, it must be applied impartially. Each of these customary 
requirements require further elaboration. 
The obvious intent of the requirement of effectiveness is to prevent 
belligerent resort to so-called ''paper'' blockades, that is, to the practice 
of declaring blockades when the naval power available is utterly inadequate 
to the task of enforcement. On the other hand, a blockade is effectively 
maintained when all-or nearly all-of the vessels attempting to enter or 
to depart from a blockaded area are prevented from so doing by the block-
ading force. Between these two situations doubt may well arise as to 
whether in a concrete instance a blockade has succeeded in meeting the test 
of effectiveness, and it would appear that the most satisfactory formula is 
that the degree of effectiveness required must be such as to render ingress 
to or egress from the blockaded area dangerous-hence seizure for breach 
of blockade probable.10 
pp. 92.-3. An excellent review and analysis of this question is given in H. W. Briggs, The Law 
of Nations (wd ed., 1953), pp. 100o-4. A recent example of the attempted closure of ports ' i 
during a period of civil war occurred in June 1949, when the Chinese Nationalist Government 
sought to close certain waters and ports held by the Communists. The incident is reviewed by 
L. H. Woolsey, "Closure of Ports by the Chinese Nationalist Government," A.]. I. L., 44 
(1950), pp. 35o-6. 
8 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 632.c. Any change in the conditions of a blockade-e. g., an 
extension of its geographical limits-will require fresh notification. 
9 Notification may therefore be actual, as by a vessel of the blockading forces, or constructive, 
as by proclamation, or by belligerent notice, or a matter of common notoriety.· However) 
Articles II and 16 of the Declaration of London accepted the practice of the continental European 
states by requiring that a declaration of blockade be formally notified to neutral governments , 
as well as to the local authorities of the blockaded area. Given the present state of communi-
cations the matter of notification no longer constitutes the problem it once did (see pp. 2.92.-3). 
10 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 632.d. Uncertainty over the application of the rule regar~ing 
effectiveness is of long standing. The 1856 Declaration of Paris, in laying down the require-
ment of effectiveness, defined an effective blockade as one "maintained by a force sufficient 
really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.'' Article 2. of the Decbration of London 
repeated this formula and added-in Article 3-that the question whether a blockade is effec-
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It is implicit in the customary rule of effectiveness, but should be given 
special emphasis in view of more recent developments, 11 that the means a 
belligerent may use in maintaining a blockade are not unlimited. More 
specifically, the effectiveness required of valid blockades cannot be secured 
by means violative of other firmly established rules. The element of danger 
associated with an effective blockade is therefore to be understood in terms 
of a liability to seizure and eventual condemnation, though not in terms 
of a liability to destruction upon entrance into the forbidden area. 12 But 
there is nothing in the traditional law preventing the use either of sub-
marines or of aircraft in maintaining a naval blockade, so long as their 
employment does not thereby result in a violation of the rules applicable 
to surface vessels. 13 
3 . Area of Blockade 
It is a settled rule of the customary law governing blockade that a 
blockading force must not bar access to neutral ports and coasts. 14 As 
tive is a question of fact." The formula "sufficient really to prevent access to the enemy coast'' 
has never been regarded as very satisfactory, if for no other reason than that a literal interpreta-
tion might appear to require the prevention of any vessel from breaching a blockade-certainly 
no requirement of law. Nor is the question whether or not a blockade is properly effective 
merely a "question of fact." As Stone (op. cit., pp. 495-6) well points out: "The degree of 
effectiveness reached in a particular case is a question of fact; but whether that degree satisfies 
the legal standard is a question of law." Inevitably, this question of law is one in which a 
substantial measure of discretion may be exercised, thus raising the possibility of controversy 
between neutral and belligerent. The formulation contained in Article 632.d, Law of Naval 
Warfare, follows the wording of previous instructions to the U.S. Navy, and is in accord with 
the opinion expressed by the Supreme Court in the The Olinde Rodriquez (1899), 174 U. S. 510. 
In this respect there is a close correspondence between the traditional American and British 
views on the rule of effectiveness. 
11 See pp. 2.96-305. 
12 Unless, of course, the vessel attempting to breach blockade either persistently refuses to 
stop upon being duly summoned by a surface warship or offers active resistance to visit and search. 
13 In any event, at least one belligerent warship would be required to carry out the functions 
of visit, search and seizure. Beyond this minimum the number of surface vessels will vary 
according to circumstances, and one of these circumstances may be the degree of support a 
surface force receives from submarines and aircraft, particularly the latter. The problems 
arising from the use of mines as an instrument of blockade may be deferred for discussion in 
relation to more recent developments (see pp. 303-5). Here it may be observed, however, 
that it is very doubtful that the traditional law could be considered as having sanctioned the 
use of mines, even as an auxiliary means for enforcing a blockade. See, for example, U. S. Naval 
War College, International Law Topics, I90J, pp. 152.-3. Finally, it should be observed in passing 
that the effectiveness of a naval blockade is not endangered by virtue of the fact that a bellig-
erent does not render passage in the air over the blockaded area dangerous. At the same time, 
it is true that a blockade ''maintained by surface vessels only without means of preventing or 
rendering dangerous the passage of aircraft ... would be a 'paper blockade' insofar as such 
craft were concerned even though proclaimed to include these." U. S. Naval War College. 
International Law Situations, I9JJ, p. 89. 
14 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 632.c. Restrictions upon the belligerent extension of a block· 
ade to certain rivers, straits and canals constitute the more detailed application of this general 
principle. For a discussion of these restrictions, see Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 
??I-s. 
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applied to "close" or "in-shore" blockades the intent of the rule is to 
prevent a belligerent from deploying a blockading force in such a manner 
as to require vessels destined to neutral ports to pass through the line of 
blockade, thereupon being seized and condemned for breach of blockade. 
The extent to which the rule operated in the past to restrict belligerent 
behavior depended largely upon the circumstances of geography. Nor-
mally, however, the danger of barring access to neutral territory was 
reduced to a minimum in the case of close blockades. Conversely, it has 
been generally contended-though the accuracy of this contention must 
be closely examined-that the possibility of conforming to the rule in 
question necessarily decreases the farther a blockading force is stationed 
from an enemy coast. 
Even prior to World War I the military feasibility of a close blockade 
was seriously questioned. As already noted, the traditional law did not 
require close blockade~ and opposition to the "long distance" blockade 
maintained by Great Britain during the first World War merely for the 
reason that the blockading force was stationed at a considerable distance 
from the enemy's coast was scarcely decisive. Indeed, as a neutral the 
United States had conceded in the early stages of that conflict that '• the 
form of' close' blockade with its cotdon of ships in the immediate offing 
of the blockaded ports is no longer practicable in the face of an enemy 
possessing the means and opportunity to make an effective defense by the 
use of submarines, mines and aircraft ... " 15 Nor was it disputed that 
the necessities imposed by geography might even render imperative that a 
blockading cordon be drawn across the sea approaches common to both 
neutral and enemy ports. But if that contingency arose, it was declared 
that a blockading belligerent would nevertheless remain obliged ''to 
comply vvith the well-recognized and reasonable prohibition of inter-
national law against the blockading of neutral ports, by according free 
admission and exit to all lawful traffic with neutral ports through the , 
blockading cordon. This traffic would, of course, include all outward-
bound traffic from the neutral country and all inward-bound traffic to the 
neutral country except contraband in transit to the enemy. 16 
What clearly emerges from the above statement is the contention that 
whatever the ultimate destination or origin of goods carried by a neutral 
vessel, seizure of the latter for breach of blockade (though not, .of course, 
for carriage of contraband) is justified only if the vessel itself is bound to or 
15 The statements quoted in the text above form a part of the correspondence between the , 
United States and Great Britain, and were occasioned by the Briti~h Order in Council of March 
II, 19r5. For a further discussion of this correspondence, together with references, see pp. 
308-ro. 
16 To which was added the further observation that: "Such procedure need not conflict in 
any respect with the rights of the belligerent maintaining the blockade since the right would 
remain with the blockading vessels to visit and search all ships either on entering or leaving 
the neutral territory which they were in fact, but not of right, investing." 
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from a blockaded port. 17 There can be little question that, in principle, 
this position formed an accurate statement of the customary law as it stood 
at the outbreak of war in I9I4-
4· Appliration of Blockade 
The third substantive principle governing the operation of a blockade is 
that it must be applied impartially to the vessels of all states-including 
the vessels of the blockading belligerent. 18 The purpose of this rule is to 
prevent a blockading belligerent from taking advantage of his position 
in order to discriminate in the treatment accorded to different countries. 
Thus a belligerent would violate the principle of impartiality if he allowed 
the vessels of certain states to pass through the blockaded area while 
excluding the vessels of other states. However, impartiality in the treat-
ment of the vessels of all states refers only to the standard of behavior 
demanded of the blockading belligerent within the area that is being 
blockaded. More precisely, the rule applies only with respect to the 
vessels of all states attempting either to enter or to depart from the block-
aded ports or coast by sea.l9 There is no requirement that a blockade 
must bear with equal severity upon the trade of neutral states. It may be 
that despite the blockade some neutrals will be able to continue to trade 
with blockaded ports by means of inland waterways. It may also be that 
by choosing to blockade only some of the ports of an enemy, while leaving 
others open, a blockade will bear more heavily upon the trade of one 
neutral than of another. In either case the neutral whose trade suffers as 
a result will have no ground for complaining that the blockading bel-
ligerent has failed to conform to the principle of impartiality. 
Nor is the obligation of impartiality violated if the commander of a 
blockading force allows neutral warships to enter and subsequently to 
depart from a blockaded port. But it is within the discretion of the com-
mander of the blockading force to decide whether or not he will permit 
such entrance and departure, and under what conditions permission will 
be granted. 2° Finally, merchant vessels in evident distress may be per-
mitted to enter and subsequently to leave a blockaded port. 21 Whether 
such permission may be detnanded as a matter of right is unsettled though. 
17 Though it should be made clear that by 1914 there was ample authority for seizing a vessel 
immediately bound for a neutral port if it could be clearly established that after touching at the 
neutral port the vessel intended to go on to a blockaded port. (See pp. 2.93-5). 
18 Law of Naval Warfat·e, Article 632.f. Article s of the Declaration of London stated that: 
"A blockade must be applied impartially to the ships of all nations." 
19 And it should be added that impartiality is quite compatible with a blockade that merely 
forbids the ingress of vessels or, conversely, the egress. There is no requirement that a belligerent 
forbid both ingress to and egress from the blockaded area. He may choose the one, or the 
other, or-as will generally be the case-both. Whatever his choice the blockade once estab-
lished must then be applied impartially. 
20 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 632.h (r). 
21 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 632.h (2.). 
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In any event, a vessel accorded the privilege of entry and departure must 
neither receive nor discharge any cargo in the blockaded port.22 
5. Termination of Blockade 
A blockade may be terminated, or raised, at any time by declaration of 
the blockading state, or by the commander of the blockading forces acting 
on behalf of his government. It is customary on such occasions for the 
blockading state to notify all neutral governments. Apart from formal 
notice neutral states may regard a blockade as raised once it is no longer 
maintained with the minimum degree of effectiveness required by law. 
For reasons already pointed out, the question as to when a blockade is no 
longer effective can hardly be regarded as self-evident~ and on this question 
the opinion of neutral states may therefore meet with resistance on the part 
of a belligerent that has sought to establish-and claims to have estab-
lished-an effective blockade. At the very least, however, it is clear that 
if a blockading force is driven off by an enemy the blockade has come to 
an end. Still further, in the event a blockading force leaves the area for 
reasons unconnected with the blockade the latter must be regarded as 
suspended. 23 
6. Breach of Blockade 
It has already been observed that knowledge of the existence of a block-
ade forms an essential condition for the offenses of breach and attempted 
breach of blockade. At one time this requirement gave rise to a marked 
diversity in state practice, since the slowness of communications frequently 
made it difficult to determine whether or not a vessel (i. e., the owner or 
master) had the requisite knowledge. Today, however, the problem has 
lost much of its former importance~ due to the rapidity with which a 
blockade's existence may be made known. There is at present general 
agreement that knowledge may be presumed in all instances where a vessel 
has sailed from the port of a neutral state whose government has already 
22 Article 7 of the Declaration of London provided that: • 'In circumstances of distress, acknowl-
edged by an authority of the blockading forces, a neutral vessel may enter a place under block-
ade and subsequently leave it, provided that she has neither discharged nor shipped any cargo 
there." And as Higgins and Colombos (op. cit., p. 546) observe: "In every case, the exemption 
based on distress must be one of uncontrollable necessity, which admits of no compromise, 
and cannot be resisted.'' 
23 Article 30 of the 1941 U. S. Navy Instructions declared that: ••If the blockading vessels be 
driven away by stress of weather and return thereafter without delay to their station? the con-
tinuity of the blockade is not thereby broken. The blockade ceases to be effective if the block-
ading vessels are driven away by the enemy or if they voluntarily leave their stations, except 
for a reason connected with the blockade; as, for instance, the chase of a blockade runner." 
The factor of weather is no longer likely to play any role in the task of maintaining a blockaqe. 
More important, the entire problem of determining when a blockade has ceased to be effective 
can no longer be regarded merely by reference to the conditions characterizing close blockad~s. 
The .. stations" for future blockading forces are likely to cover vast areas of the high seas, and 
it will prove as difficult to determine when vessels have ••left their stations" as it will be to 
judge when they have been .. driven away" by an enemy. 
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received notification of the blockade. And even in the absence of such 
fortnal notification a presumption of knowledge will arise-at least accord-
ing to American and British practice-if the existence of the blockade is 
nevertheless considered to be a mat ter of common notoriety.24 
Breach of blockade therefore occurs-according to the customary law-
when a vessel knowing, or presumed to know, of a blockade passes through 
the forbidden area. In addition, according to the traditional view of the 
United States and Great Britain the liability to seizure of a blockade runner 
extended throughout the dura don of her voyage. . Hence if a vessel sailed 
from her home port with the clear intent to evade the-blockade, liability 
to seizure (for attempted breach of blockade) began from the time the 
vessel first appeared on the open seas. Conversely, if a vessel once suc-
ceeded in breaking out of a blockaded port, liability to seizure continued 
until completion of the voyage. 25 
On the other hand, the position taken by a number of European states 26 
24 With respect to breach of blockade by ingress Article 15 of the Declaration of London 
provided that: "Failing proof to the contrary, knowledge of the blockade is presumed if the 
vessel left a neutral port subsequently to the notification of the blockade made in sufficient 
time to the Power to which such port belongs." Article 16 went on to state that if a vessel 
did not know or could not be presumed to know of the blockade ''notification must be made 
to the vessel itself by an officer of one of the ships of the blockading force." In effect, these 
provisions narrowed considerably the differences formerly existing between Anglo-American 
and continental practices, since notice by direct warning was restricted-by Article 16-to 
relatively infrequent cases. 
With respect to breach of blockade by egress Article 16 went on to declare that: "A neutral 
vessel which leaves a blockaded port must be allowed to pass free if, through the negligence 
of the officer commanding the blockading force, no declaration has been notified to the local 
authorities, or, if, in the declaration, as notified, no delay has been indicated." But this pro-
vision was at variance with American and British practice, which always presumed knowledge 
on the part of vessels within blockaded ports. 
25 Thus paragraph 31 of the U. S. Navy's 1917 Instructions declared that the liability of a 
blockade runner to capture and condemnation "begins and terminates with her voyage. If 
there is good evidence that she sailed with intent to evade the blockade, she is liable to capture 
from the moment she appears upon the high seas. If a vessel has succeeded in escaping from 
a blockaded port, she is liable to capture at any time before she completes her voyage. But 
with the termination of the voyage the offense ends." Article 44 of the U.S. Naval War Code, 
1900, made a substantially similar provision. The traditional British position has been sum-
marized as follows: "Liability to capture, according to British practice, in the case of a ship 
which breaks out continues from the time of sailing until the whole voyage is completed, and 
is not discarded by touching at some intermediate port on the way to the final destination. 
Similarly in the case of breaking in the liability commences from the moment the vessel sails 
with the formed intention of breaking the blockade, and continues until the blockade has been 
raised or the intention has been clearly and voluntarily abandoned. But this change of inten-
tion must be complete. A ship is not permitted to proceed to a neighboring port with a view 
to making inquiries as to the chances of running in from there, and with the intention of taking 
those chances if they appear reasonable but abandoning the intention if force of circumstances 
and the vigilance of the blockading squadron make it inadvisable to persist. A ship must have 
a clear and innocent programme from the outset." J. A. Hall, Law of Naval Warfare, pp. 2.05-6. 
26 E. g., France, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands. 
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had been to insist that a vessel could be seized for blockade running only 
within the immediate area of operation of the blockading forces. Further-
more, liability to seizure followed-in this view-only from overt action 
on the part of a vessel to break through the lines of blockade. 27 In the 
1909 Declaration of London the attempt was made to resolve these diver-
gent views. 28 Accordingly, that instrument provided that the seizure of 
neutral vessels for violation of blockade could be undertaken "only within 
the radius of action of the ships of war assigned to maintain an effective 
blockade.'' 29 A further provision laid down that ''whatever rna y be the 
ulterior destination of the vessel or of her cargo the evidence of violation 
of blockade is not sufficiently conclusive to authorize the seizure of the 
vessel if she is at the time bound toward an unblockaded port.'' 30 
It must be etnphasized that in blockade it is the destination of the ves-
sel-not of the cargo-that forms the decisive consideration. At least this 
was true prior to I 914. However, the Anglo-American view had been that 
liability for blockade running could not be avoided simply for the reason 
that a vessel intended to touch at an intermediate neutral port prior to 
making for a blockaded port. To this very limited extent the doctrine of 
continuous voyage may be said to have been applicable to the offense of 
attempting to break blockade, and for this reason Article 19 of the Decla-
ration of London may not be regarded as providing an accurate statement 
of the position heretofore taken by the United States and Great Britain. 
But in providing that a vessel was not liable to seizure if encountered bound 
for a neutral port, simply because the cargo carried on board was ultimately 
27 The one exception being that seizure was considered permissible outside this area in the 
case of a blockade runner actively pursued by a vessel of the blockading forces. 
28 It is true that in practice these differences were not as great as might otherwise appear, 
and Higgins and Colombos (op. cit., p. 552.) point out that "there is no case in actual practice 
in which a vessel has been condemned for breach of blockade except when she was found ac-
tually close to or directly approaching the blockaded port." Nevertheless, there are a number ' 
of instances in which courts did give careful attention to the ultimate destination of vessels 
encountered some distance from the blockading forces, and even purportedly bound for neutral 
ports. Besides, this practice refers to close blockades. It is clear that in a long-distance 
blockade-considered as such-the standards regarding evidence of intention that were formerly 
applied to close blockades would necessarily present easy opportunity for evasion. Nor is it 
reasonable to expect belligerents to adhere to these former standards in operating long-distance 
blockades. In this respect belligerent practice in the two World Wars is likely to provide 
more accurate guidance for the future (see pp. 308-15). 
29 Article 17. This provision was viewed at the time as a compromise between the Anglo-
American and the continental view, the term "area of operations" (rayon d'action) being regarded 
as a formula whose elasticity was sufficiently great to provide reasonable adaptation to the 
developing weapons of naval warfare. In reality, though, Article 17 left the old dispute very 
nearly where it found it, since the continental powers urged that the "area of operations" be 
rather strictly confined whereas the British and American delegations pressed for the right of 
the blockading belligerent to fix the radius of action, depending upon the circumstances govern-
ing each case. 
30 Article 19. 
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destined for the blockaded area, Article 19 did give expression to the 
consensus of the major naval powers. It is true that during the American 
Civil War there were several cases that could possibly be interpreted as 
extending liability to seizure for blockade breach to vessels sailing for 
neutral ports, with no ulterior destination, though carrying cargoes ulti-
mately destined to pass through the blockade. But whatever the inter-
pretation given these cases it is reasonably clear that prior to World War I 
they had not been considered either by the United States or by Great 
Britain-and certainly not by any other maritime powers-as having come 
to represent a part of the established law governing liability for breach of 
blockade. 31 
7· Penalty for Breach of Blockade 
The penalty for breach-or attempted breach-of blockade is the confis-
cation of the vessel and cargo. As an exception, if the owners of (non-
contraband) cargo can establish ignorance either of the existence of a 
blockade at the time they put their goods on board the blockade runner or 
of the intention of the vessel to violate the blockade such goods will not 
be condemned. 32 
31 Nearly all of the Civil War cases were ambiguous in this respect since they also involved 
the carriage of contraband, and seizure (as well as condemnation) could have followed on this 
ground alone. It is Hyde's opinion (op. cit., p. 2.2.12.) that "attentive examination of certain 
important American cases oftentimes regarded by the commentators as indicating an unfortunate 
invocation of the doctrine of continuous voyage to establish breach of blockade, reveals the 
fact that there were in almost every instance other grounds for decision. Hence numerous 
dicta in relation to blockade running lack the significance frequently attached to them.'' It 
should be added that these cases involved instances where either the ultimate destination of 
both vessel and cargo was the blockaded area or where the cargo alone was destined to pass 
through the lines of blockade (being carried on a different vessel). In the case of cargo des-
tined for the blockaded area by a route other than by way of the forbidden passage there was a 
clear refusal to consider liability for breach of blockade as arising. 
It is believed to be of some importance to emphasize the position held by the United States 
prior to 1914 with respect to the application of the doctrine of continuous voyage to blockade. 
In retrospect, a number of writers have ventured to attribute to this earlier position a character 
that would appear altogether unwarranted. Apart from a small number of rather obscure 
and controversial Civil War decisions, there is no indication that in the period prior to World 
War I the United States had ever endorsed the application of the principle of continuous voyage 
to blockade, save in the very restricted sense already referred to in the text. There is a consid-
erable difference, however, between applying the principle of continuous voyage to a vessel 
and applying the same principle to cargo carried by a vessel. Whereas the former application had 
been clearly endorsed by this country the latter had not. Nor did any change occur in this 
respect in either the 1917 or the 1941 Instructions. But see Law of Naval Warfare, Article 632.g (3), 
for a limited change from the earlier position in the light of belligerent practice during the two 
World Wars. And see pp. 305-17 for a discussion of recent belligerent practice and the prob-
lems to which this practice has given rise. 
32 Either possibility is highly unlikely. Besides, the exception does not apply to goods 
owned by those who also own the vessel, since in the latter instance the master of the vessel 
is considered to be the agent of the shipowners. 
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C. BELLIGERENT "BLOCKADE" MEASURES IN THE TWO 
WORLD WARS 
I. Claims to Restrict Neutral Navigation Tbrough the Estahlishment of 
Special Zones 
The effective maintenance of a lawful blockade of any magnitude neces-
sarily requires an appreciable commitment of surface naval forces. 33 Recent 
experience has indicated, however, that if belligerents are determined to 
isolate an enemy the temptation will prove strong to achieve the purposes 
of a blockade though without conforming to the established principles 
regulating this form of belligerent interference with neutral commerce. 
Since 1914 one of the principal devices for accomplishing the purposes of a 
blockade has been the establishment of special areas or zones, variously 
described, 34 within which belligerents have claimed the right either to 
restrict neutral freedom of navigation or to forbid such navigation alto-
gether. 
At the very least, the belligerent in proclaiming these special zones-
which frequently covered vast tracts of the high seas-has assumed the 
competence to render the waters included therein dangerous to neutral 
shipping through the laying of mines. Neutral vessels have been warned 
33 This remains true even though the use of aircraft as an auxiliary arm of blockade may 
reduce considerably the need for surface vessels to patrol large areas-as in the case of blockades 
maintained at great distances from an enemy's coasts. For the necessity to effect lawful seizure 
of blockade runners remains. 
34 The varied terminology used in reference to the1>e areas (e. g., "operational zones," "war 
zones," "barred areas," "military areas," "areas dangerous to shipping") forms a possible 
source of confusion. On the one hand, different terms have frequently been used to refer to 
areas in which substantially similar measures were employed. (E. g., the German distinction 
between kriegsgebiet and sperrgebiet, the former indicating a "military area" or "war zone" in 
which the use of arms is to be expected at any time and the latter signifying a "barred" or , 
"forbidden" zone in which every merchant ship-enemy or neutral-may expect to be treated 
as an enemy warship. But from the point of view of the actual measures taken against neutral 
vessels the differentiation between kriegsgebiet and sperrgebiet (or seesperre) appears only to have 
resulted in a distinction without a difference). On the other hand, the same term has occa-
sionally been used in reference to areas in which quite different measures were taken by bellig-
erents. It remains true, however, that despite differences in the specific measures taken by 
belligerents within these zones the common intent has been to limit neutral freedom of navi-
gation through the resort to methods that avoid the commitment of surface forc~s otherwise 
required in maintaining a lawful blockade (or, for that matter, in maintaining a system of con-
traband control conforming to the traditional law). This decisive point is clearly recognized 
by Stone (op. cit., p. 572.), who writes: "While its (i.e., "barred" or "war" zones) uses may 
vary, its function is essentially to reduce the belligerents required commitment of surface ves_sels 
in naval operations of economic warfare, whether defensive or offensive, and whether covering 
ports or coast line, or hundreds of miles therefrom. Such economies have been made pos~ible 
by the invention of new methods and weapons such as submarines, contact mi~es, magnetic 
and acoustic mines, and radio-telegraphy. By such means, great areas of the high seas may be 
rendered so dangerous for navigation that they do not need surface patrols." 
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that if entering these areas the belligerent could not insure their safety-or 
accept responsibility in the event of their destruction by mines-unless the 
vessels folowed prescribed routes and submitted to certain further controls 
laid down by the belligerent. 35 The more extreme measures taken by 
belligerents sought to prohibit the entrance of neutral vessels into barred 
zones by threatening to deprive entering vessels of all safeguards normally 
accorded peaceful shipping. Thus the German war zone declarations of 
January 31, 1917 and August 17, 1940 stated that neutral vessels persisting 
in entering forbidden areas would thereby become liable to destruction at 
sight by submarines and aircraft. 36 
35 Thus on November 3, 1914, Great Britain declared that the whole of the North Sea would 
thereafter be considered a "military area." The declaration went on to state that within this 
area "merchant shipping of all kinds, traders of all countries, fishing craft, and all other vessels, 
will be exposed to the gravest dangers from mines which it has been necessary to lay and from 
warships searching vigilantly by night and day for suspicious craft." U. S. Naval War College, 
International Law Documents, I94J, p. 52.. The action was taken as a defensive "counter measure" 
against what was alleged to be the German policy of using merchant vessels (flying neutral 
flags) to lay mines indiscriminately on the high seas, and particularly along the ordinary trade 
routes, in violation of the provisions of Hague Convention VII (1907 ). In declaring the "mili-
tary area" instructions were given to neutral vessels, intending to trade with Northern European 
and Dutch ports, to follow certain prescribed routes. Provided this was done, and other minor 
controls were adhered to, Great Britain accepted responsibility for insuring the safety of neutral 
traffic. One of the immediate effects of the measure was to bring neutral shipping using this 
area under the close scrutiny of the British contraband controls. The United States refrained 
from joining other neutrals in entering a strong protest against the measure, and upon entering 
the hostilities itself cooperated-in 1918-with the British in laying a mine field extending 
across the North Sea. See E. Turlington, op. cit., pp. 36-48. 
On the outbreak of war in September 1939, the British Government notified neutrals that 
mines were being laid in restricted areas off the British coast as well as in specified regions off 
the German coast. In December 1939, the Admiralty gave notice of its intention to lay exten-
sive minefields in the North Sea off the east coast of England and Scotland. In April 1940, it 
was announced that minefields had been, or would be, laid in the North Sea from the proximity 
of the Dutch coast to the Norwegian coast, in the Skaggerak (except for a twenty mile wide 
channel), in the whole of the Kattegat, and in the Southern Baltic. Later, still further mine-
fields were declared. Once again, Great Britain accepted the responsibility of providing for 
the safety of legitimate neutral shipping passing through some (though not all) of these mine 
fields. Neutral vessels found inside the areas were subject to removal by British warships and, 
if found making use of communication facilities contrary to zoning orders, even to seizure for 
unneutral service. Nor did Great Britain appear to have attempted to justify these measures 
as acts of a retaliatory character. 
36 The German declaration of February 4, 1915, in which the waters surrounding Great 
Britain and Ireland were proclaimed a "theatre of war," was not expressly intended-at least 
not on paper-to interdict neutral vessels. Instead, it was stated that enemy merchant vessels 
would be sunk without warning and neutral ships would navigate at their peril" ... for even 
though the German naval forces have instructions to avoid violence to neutral ships in so far 
as they are recognizable, in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered by the British Govern-
ment and the contingencies of naval warfare their becoming victims of torpedoes directed 
against enemy ships cannot always be avoided .... " U. S. Naval War College, International 
Law Docttments, I94J, p. 53· On the other hand, the declaration of January 31, 1917 broadened 
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It need hardly be pointed out that these belligerent measures cannot be 
regarded as conforming to the customary requirements laid down for lawful 
blockades. Even if completely effective in preventing all neutral traffic 
with an enemy, and this possibility can no longer be excluded, 37 the methods 
that have characterized war zone operations would not warrant serious 
consideration in this respect, for the degree of effective danger that is to 
attend the attempt to break blockade must be a lawful danger. There is 
no basis for the belief that the requirement of effectiveness, demanded of 
lawful blockades, can be met simply by using any means in order to render 
dangerous the passage of neutral vessels through areas of the high seas 
declared to be "blockaded." 38 
The foregoing considerations admittedly are not conclusive in judging 
whether the belligerent establishment of war zones may be regarded as 
legitimate methods of warfare at sea. The fact that they cannot be re-
garded as forming lawful measures of blockade does not prevent their 
possible justification on quite different grounds. In a sense it may even 
prove somewhat misleading to deal with these special zones in connection 
with the general problem of blockade) and the only reason for doing so-
as already noted-is that they have been largely intended to accomplish 
the same purposes as blockade. Even so, the central question remains: 
Have belligerents any right either to restrict or to exclude altogether 
considerably this earlier area (now termed a "war zone," and even a "blockade area") and 
extended the unrestricted submarine warfare to neutral vessels as well. In both declarations 
the measures were described as retaliatory, and a response to the allegedly unlawful behavior 
of the Allies. 
In World War II the German Government announced, on August 17, 1940, a "total blockade" 
of Great Britain. Alleging that England had acted increasingly in violation of the rules regu-
lating belligerent behavior at sea, thus justifying German retaliatory measures, the announce-
ment concluded: 
"Germany, having repeatedly warned these [neutral] States not to send their ships into the 
waters around the British Isles, has now again requested, in a note, these governments to 
forbid their ships from entering the Anglo-German war zones. It is in the interest of these 
States themselves to accede to this German request as soon as possible. 
The Reich Government wishes to emphasize the following fact: The naval war in the waters 
around the British Isles is in full progress. 
The whole area has been mined. 
German planes attack every vessel. Any neutral ship which in the future enters 'these waters 
is liable to be destroyed." U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, I940·, pp. 46-50. 
37 Developments in submarines and aircraft alone make this possibility a very real one today. 
38 It is primarily for this reason that it has always been doubtful whether a belligerent is · 
permitted to use mines as a supplementary means for enforcing an otherwise lawful blockade 
(and not so much for the reason, generally advanced, that Article 2. of Hague VII forbids the 
laying of automatic contact mines "off the coasts and ports of the enemy, with the sole object 
of interrupting commercial shipping''). By establishing a blockade a belligerent is not thereby 
granted the special license to subject neutral vessels and aircraft to grave hazards that are 
otherwise forbidden by law (seep. 2.89). 
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neutral vessels 39 from navigating within certain areas of the high seas by 
rendering these areas dangerous to shipping? 40 In addition, what is the 
extent of this belligerent right-assuming such right to exist-and the 
obligations that accompany its exercise? 
It is reasonably well established, to begin with, that a belligerent is per-
mitted to place restrictions upon, and even to forbid altogether, neutral 
n~vigation in two quite distinct-and limited-areas. In the first, the 
practice of states has sanctioned belligerent efforts. to acquire a greater 
measure of security through according belligerents the right to exercise 
control over neutral vessels within a restricted area of the high seas adjacent 
39 It should be pointed out that in considering the legal issues raised by the belligerent estab-
lishment of war zones most writers have emphasized only the effect of such zones on neutral-
though not enemy-merchant vessels, despite the fact that the zones have operated equally 
against both. Thus Stone (op. cit., p. 572.) writes that as "between the belligerents inter se 
this belligerent assertion of extended control raises no problems." In still another treatise it 
is observed that: "As between the belligerents only, provided that the war zone is enforced 
by the use of means, whether submarine contact mines, or surface or submarine craft, which 
comply with the laws of maritime warfare, both customary and conventional, there can be no 
doubt of the lawfulness of the practice." Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 682.. In reality, 
these statements, and particularly the latter, would appear an evasion of the issue. Insofar 
as operational zones "comply with the laws of maritime warfare" they are quite superfluous, 
at least if by this the traditional law is understood. Save as a measure of reprisal against an 
enemy, the mere fact that a belligerent has declared a war zone does not serve to confer upon 
him greater discretion in the measures taken against enemy merchant vessels. On the other 
hand, if it is assumed that as between belligerents the declaration of war zones "raises no 
problems," this can be so only for the reason that by such declaration the powers of a belligerent 
with respect to enemy merchant vessels are not substantially increased. This assumption, 
implying as it does a belligerent license to destroy enemy merchant vessels without first re-
moving passengers and crew to a place of safety, cannot yet be accepted. But it is quite true 
that given the circumstances in which warfare at sea is now carried on (see pp. 6710), as between 
belligerents the declaration of special zones in which merchant vessels are not accorded the 
immunities demanded by the traditional law may add very little to the measures a belligerent 
may in any event take against enemy shipping. And it is for this reason that the legal issues 
raised by war zones have related primarily to neutral shipping. However, should belligerents 
refrain in future hostilities from integrating their merchant vessels into the military effort at _ 
sea there would be no justification for the policy of destruction on sight. Nor, for that matter, 
would a belligerent be justified in introducing such a policy through the device of proclaiming 
war zones. 
40 To what extent the issues involved in the declaration of war zones at sea apply to aerial 
zones above the high seas-barred to neutral civil aircraft-is difficult to say. There would 
appear to be no difficulty in accepting the position taken by Spaight (op. cit., pp. 400-1), that 
belligerents may forbid neutral aircraft from entering zones where military operations are in 
progress (a point that will be discussed shortly). But this claim is clearly a modest one, 
being limited to the immediate area of operations (naval or aerial). The real question, how-
ever, is not whether belligerent license in the air is as great as at sea, but whether it is greater-
in view of the formative character of the law of aerial warfare. Nevertheless, it must be 
admitted that it is impossible to state with any real precision the present limits of the controls 
permitted to belligerents over neutral aircraft in the airspace above the high seas (and see pp. 
354-6). 
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to territorial waters.41 Within these waters belligerents may lay mine 
fields and take other measures designed to insure the defense of co as tal 
regions. It does not appear possible at the present time, however, to state 
with any degree of precision either the extent these areas may take or the 
intensity of the controls that may be exercised within them. It does seem 
fairly clear that the general criteria to be used in judging the legitimacy 
of a particular defensive area must be the reasonableness of its extent, in 
terms of its essentially defensive function, as well as the ability of the bellig-
erent to exercise a close and effective control over the area. But beyond 
this little more can be said. 
Altogether different, yet equally well established in practice, is the right 
of a belligerent to control the movements of neutral vessels and aircraft 
within the immediate area of naval operations. If necessary, a belligerent 
commander can order such vessels and aircraft to depart from these areas. 
H allowed to remain within the vicinity where forces are operating they 
must obey such orders as are given to them (e. g., with respect to the use 
of radio), and any failure to do so-or to depart from the area when so 
ordered-will render offending vessels and aircraft liable to being fired 
upon or captured.42 Nor can vessels complain if, -while remaining within 
the near vicinity of belligerent operations, they are made subject to the 
incidental hazards invariably attending the conduct of such operations. 
It should be emphasized, though, that the immediate area of naval 
operations refers to an area within which naval hostilities are taking place 
or within which belligerent forces are actually operating. As such it 
41 See pp. 2.2.4-6 for a discussion of similar measures undertaken by neutrals. In large measure, 
the considerations introduced in this previous discussion are equally applicable to belligerents. 
Apparently, the first instance of "defensive sea areas" proclaimed by a belligerent occurred 
during the Russo-Japanese War, when Japan proclaimed that within certain coastal zones 
neutral shipping would be subject to special restrictions. U.S. Naval War College, l1zternational 
Law Topics, zg12, p. 12.2.. In both World Wars the United States, as a belligerent, established ' 
several "defensive sea areas" and "maritime control areas," which included territorial waters 
as well as a very limited area beyond these waters. 
42 Law of Naval Warfare, Articles 43ob and 52.oa. Recognition of the right of belligerents 
to control the activities of neutral vessels and aircraft within the immediate vicinity of naval 
operations may be found in the naval manuals of a number of states. In Article 7 of the un-
ratified Rules for the Control of Radio in Time of War, which formed Part I of the 1923 Rules 
drafted by the Commission of Jurists at the Hague, a belligerent commanding officer, considering 
the success of his operation to be prejudiced by the presence of vessels or aircraft equipped with 
radio installation, was authorized to order such vessels and aircraft to depart from the area or-
if remaining-not to make use of their radio apparatus while within the vicinity of belligerent 
forces. Failure to conform with the orders given was held to result in liability to capture or 
to the risk of being fired upon. Finally, Article 30 of the 192.3 Rules of Aerial Warfare declared 
that: "In case a belligerent commanding officer considers that the presence of aircraft is likely 
to prejudice the success of the operations in which he is engaged at the moment, he may prohibit 
the passing of neutral aircraft in the immediate vicinity of his forces or may oblige them to 
follow a particular route. A neutral aircraft which does not conform to such directions . . . 
may be fired upon.'' 
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must be clearly distinguished from those special areas or zones of indefinite 
extent not made the scene of naval hostilities and entrance into which is 
forbidden to neutral vessels for substantial periods of time. The claim to 
control neutral vessels and aircraft within the immediate vicinity of oper-
ating forces is essentially a limited and transient one and is based not only 
upon the right of a belligerent to insure the security of his forces but upon 
the right to attack and to defend himself without interference from neu-
trals. 43 
Neither of the preceding examples represent serious restrictions upon 
neutral freedom of navigation on the high seas. Both types of areas are 
related to belligerent requirements of a narrowly defensive character, and 
the controls belligerents may exercise within them are generally recognized 
as outweighing the limited inconvenience caused to neutrals. However, 
in the belligerent establishment of war zones there may be found a serious-
and perhaps even a fatal-blow to the traditional law. This threat arises 
only in part from the fact that, in principle, war zones have had no clearly 
discernible limits, whether in their geographical extent or in their duration. 
Equally important is the central purpose they are designed to serve, which 
is to a void committing large surface forces to the task of cutting off an 
enemy's sea borne commerce through adherence to methods sanctioned by 
the traditional law. 
Nor rna y it be of more than limited relevance that the measures taken by 
belligerents in the establishment of war zones were based, at least in the 
1914 war, almost entirely upon the right to retaliate against the allegedly 
unlawful behavior of an opponent. Even during the second World War 
belligerents retained in a number of instances the form of reprisals when 
establishing war zones, thereby acknowledging that the measures con-
templated against neutral shipping were in normal circumstances without 
justification in law. Yet by the close of the 1939 war the persistent and 
widespread resort to war zones had undeniably served to raise the question 
whether the act of establishing such zones was any longer in need of the 
plea of reprisals,44 a plea that had admittedly taken on a rather perfunctory 
43 It is only to be expected that belligerents will attempt-and have attempted-to assimilate 
the two types of areas into one category, the purpose being to justify war zones by an appeal 
to grounds properly reserved for immediate areas of naval operations. Occasionally, writers 
also fail to make the distinction emphasized above, with the result that the essential differences 
between these two areas are obscured. 
44 During the inter-war period a number of German writers had already concluded that the 
belligerent establishment of barred zones stood in no need of the special justification of reprisals. 
Instead, it was contended that neutral vessels must suffer the consequences (i. e., destruction) 
if they persist upon entering areas declared as forbidden or barred by the belligerent. The 
belligerent is obligated-from this point of view-only to make known to neutrals the exact 
position of the barred zone; having once proclaimed the extent of the zone and the measures 
to be taken therein against neutral vessels he is relieved of further responsibility (e. g., E. 
Schmitz, "Sperrgebiete im Seekrieg," Zeitschrift fur auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volker-
recht, 8 (1938), pp. 641-71. And for a more recent-and seemingly sympathetic-view by a 
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character and that on occasion was sin1ply omitted altogether. And even 
if the latter question 1nust still be answered affirmatively, the consideration 
remains that for all practical purposes there may be little difference between 
permitting war zones to be established only as retaliatory measures and 
according belligerents the competence to resort to these measures as a 
matter of legal righ t, quite apat·t from reprisal. In either event the conse-
quences for neutral commerce may be very nearly the same, particularly if 
the resort to reprisals becomes-as it has become in recent naval hostilities-
a permanent feature of warfare at sea. 
Nevertheless, while a legal analysis cannot be unmindful of current-and 
persistent-realities it cannot make so easy an identification of legal right 
with belligerent practices Not only have the more extreme of these 
practices failed to receive the acquiescence of a majority of states, they 
have been made the object of general condemnation even when resorted to 
under the guise of reprisals Thus, it is at least clear that the measures 
Germany sought to take within war zones-against neutral vessels-have 
not received approval, whatever the justification urged on their behalf. 45 
Swiss writer, see H. E. Duttwyler, Der Seekrieg und die Wirtschaftspolitik des Neutralm Staates 
(1945) , pp. 38-41). The novelty of this theory must be found in the contention that the prin-
cipal requirement for almost any belligerent measure against neutral shipping-regardless of 
the degree to which such measure may depart from established law-is prior notice on the 
part of the belligerent. It need hardly be pointed out, however, that no legality attaches to a 
belligerent measure merely for the reason that neutrals have been given prior warning. Nor is 
there any merit in the equally novel argument that the effectiveness of the belligerent measures 
taken within barred zones provides a basis for asserting the lawful character of such measures.-
Not infrequently, however, these arguments have been further obscured by identifying "barred 
zones" with what are in reality "immediate areas of operations," the apparent intent being 
to justify the attack upon neutral vessels that have allegedly interfered with "belligerent 
operations ." The wholly unwarranted basis for this latter identification has been noted in 
the preceding discussion. 
45 As already noted, the essential feature of this practice has been the claim that the declara- ' 
tion of war zones provides a sufficient justification-particularly when taken as a reprisal-for 
barring all neutral shipping from a defined area, and for making neutral vessels entering the 
area after notification liable to destruction at sight by submarines or aircraft. In considering 
this practice the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg declared: 
" ... the proclamation of operational zones and the sinking of neutral merchant vessels 
which enter these zones presents a different question. This practice was employed in the war 
of 1914-18 by Germany and adopted in retaliation by Great Britain. The Washington Con-
ference of 19'-'-, the London Naval Agreement of 1930, and the protocol of 1936 were entered 
into with full knowledge that such zones had been employed in the first World War. Yet the 
protocol made no exception for operational zones. The order of Doenitz to sink neutral ships 
without warning when found within these zones was, therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal, 
a violation of the protocol." For text of judgment, U. S. Naval War College, International Law 
Documents, I946-47, p. 300. 
Although the Tribunal did not expressly so state, the implication is reasonably clear" that 
the sinking of neutral vessels within operational zones was not justified even as a measure of 
reprisal. Nevertheless, the Tribunal did not pronounce sentence on the accused (Admiral 
Doenitz) for his breaches of the international law governing the conduct of submarine warfare, 
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This same broad consensus appears lacking in the evaluation of belligerent 
claims to establish barred areas of indefinite extent on the open seas through 
the laying of mine fields. Indeed, the severe condemnation of war zones 
from which neutral shipping is barred under threat of destruction from sub-
marines and aircraft has not infrequently been accompanied by the acqui-
escence to zones from which neutral shipping is barred by means almost 
equally destructive. In large measure, the source of this extraordinary po-
sition may be attributed to a convention-Hague Convention VIII (1907)-
that has been described, and not inaccurately, as worthless. 46 Although 
the avowed purpose of Hague Convention VIII is to provide for the security 
of" peaceful shipping," the effect of that instrument has been to invite the 
abandonment by belligerents of any substantial restraints upon the use of 
mines. According to a literal reading of Article 2. a belligerent has only to 
proclaim that his "sole" intention is not to intercept peaceful shipping in 
order to lay automatic contact mines off the ports and coasts of an enemy. 
In addition, Article 3 allows the implication that, within the terms of the 
Convention, belligerents may sew anchored automatic contact mines any-
where upon the high seas. Nor is a belligerent even placed under a strict 
obligation to notify third states of the precise location and extent of mine 
fields once laid. Instead, the obligation is only "to notify the danger 
zones as soon as military exigencies permit." Hence the interpretation is 
allowed that it is only mine laying of an openly indiscriminate character 
that is prohibited-i.e., mines sewn without regard to any definite military 
operation save that of endangering all peaceful shipping, and without any 
reasonable assurance of control or surveillance. 47 The experience of World 
Wars I and II has shown that no appreciable amount of ingenuity is required 
"'in view of all the facts proved and in particular of an order of the British Admiralty announced 
on May 8, 1940, according to which aJl vessels should be sunk at sight in the Skaggerak, and 
the answers to interrogatories by Admiral Nimitz stating that unrestricted submarine warfare 
was carried on in the Pacific Ocean by the United States from the first day that Nation entered 
the war .... " It may be of some relevance to observe that the unrestricted warfare carried 
on in the Pacific Ocean by the United States was directed against Japanese merchant vessels, 
though not against neutral shipping (which was, by this time, almost non-existent). The 
British order in the Skaggerak, though certainly affecting neutral shipping, was given during 
the period following upon the German invasion of Norway. At that time the Skaggerak came 
very close to resembling an "immediate area of naval operations." For these reasons, it is 
difficult to see how the "'facts" cited by the Tribunal could be considered as offsetting the 
measures taken by Germany within operational zones against neutral shipping. 
46 "As an instrument of control," H. A. Smith (op. cit., p. 95) writes of Hague VIII, "the 
convention is quite worthless and does not merit detailed examination.'' In fact, it is somewhat 
worse than worthless in that it has provided belligerents with arguments that would otherwise 
find no justification. A useful review of the problem, as seen from the viewpoint of the cus-
tomary law, is given in U. S. Naval War College, International Law Topics, I9I4, pp. roo-38. 
47 See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 6n, for the text of Hague VIII. According to Article 1 
of the Convention the laying of unanchored automatic contact mines is forbidden except when 
~o constructed as to become harmless one hour after the person laying them ceases to control 
them. 
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of a belligerent to reconcile almost any use of mines with the requirements 
laid down in these provisions. 48 
It may be suggested, however, that the provisions of Hague Convention 
VIII need not-and, indeed, should not-be considered as exhausting the 
scope of a belligerent's obligations. The general principle that the burden 
of proving the legitimacy of any particular iorm of interference with neutral 
vessels rests squarely upon the belligerent asserting it is as applicable-in 
the case of war zones-to the use of mines 49 as it is to the use of sub-
marines. 50 There is no apparent reason for considering the one instrument 
less hazardous to neutral merchant vessels than the other. Nor is it easy 
to see why the destruction of neutral vessels through mines is somehow less 
violative of the rule forbidding the sinking of such vessels before first re-
moving passengers and crew to a place of safety than is the same act of de- , 
struction when performed by submarines. Finally, if the mere act of de-
claring that within a certain area neutral vessels will thereafter be destroyed 
by submarines cannot serve to render such destruction lawful, how can a , 
similar declaration notifying the extent of a minefield-entrance into which 
is accompanied by the risk of destruction-make the latter measure lawful? 
In either case neutral vessels may be confronted with the alternatives of ' 
avoiding the barred areas or entering it at the risk of destruction. 51 
4BThus in the initial stages of the 1939 war Great Britain charged that Germany-as in 1914-
had violated the provisions of Hague VIII by the indiscriminate laying of mines along the paths 
of the principal trade routes, by failure to notify peaceful shipping of the precise extent of the 
minefi.elds, and by laying mines off the English coasts for the sole purpose of interrupting 
neutral shipping. Germany denied these charges, asserting that the notification of mine-
fields depended upon military considerations which Germany alone could judge and that the 
purpose of laying minefields off the English coasts was not for the' 'sole purpose of intercepting 
commercial shipping." See Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. so~n .. 
49 A principle that appears equally applicable to the belligerent use of magnetic and acoustic 
mines (whether laid by surface vessels or aircraft), even though Hague VIII refers only to auto~ 
marie contact mines. 
50 And this is particularly so when such belligerent claims to restrict neutral commerce as ' 
war zones represent are carried out by methods violative of other established rules of law. 
51 The above considerations may appear-when once they have been made-as almost self-
evident. Yet it is surprising how frequently they have been neglected by writers who look 
upon the submarine with critical eyes, though viewing the use of mines with what approaches 
equanimity. And it is for this reason that some writers-particularly German publicists-
have suggested that the belligerent measure of proclaiming barred areas, in ·which neutral 
vessels thereafter entering incur the risk of attack from submarine, does not essentially differ 
from the establishment of minefields from which neutral vessels are also barred. In considering 
the latter argument, Stone (op. cit., p. 574) observes that: "Retaliation apart, the belligerent 
case may rest on the argument that neutrals cannot complain of- the laying of individual mines 
of a lawful type, at particular places on the high seas, and that a 'barred zone' is after all merely 
a systematic disposition over a wide area of mines lawfully sown at each point within it .. This 
argument on principle would, however, still afford no legal warrant for attaching an·y legal ' 
liabilities, such as liability to be sunk at sea, to the neutral's trespass into that zone." But this 
is surely an obscure position. A barred zone may be as much "enforced" by mines as by sub-
marines, and in both instances there is an attempt to attach a "legal liability" in the event of 
forbidden entrance. 
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In brief, it is difficul t to avoid the conclusion that there is no greater 
legitimacy attached to the use of mines as a means for establishing war 
zones on the high seas than there is in the use of other means (e. g., sub-
marines) in order to realize the same purpose. Still further, it does not 
appear possible to assert that-apart from reprisal-belligerents have at 
present the right to restrict the movement of neutral vessels within vast 
tracts of the open seas merely by proclaiming that these areas have been 
rendered dangerous-in one form or another-to neutral shipping. Hence, 
despite bellgerent practices in two wars the establishment of war zones 
forms a lawful measure only when taken in response to the persistent mis-
conduct of an enemy. 52 Even then, belligerents have not yet been conceded 
the right to bar altogether such areas to the use of innocent neutral traffic. 53 
Instead, the right to restrict the freedom of movement of neutral vessels 
implies the belligerent obligation to. indicate certain routes by which 
neutral traffic may pass through the declared war zones with a reasonable 
assurance of safety. 54 
2.. The Allied ''Blockades'' of Germany 
Although the practice of interdicting neutral intercourse with an enemy 
through the establishment of special areas or zones was not confined to 
any one belligerent it is properly associated-particularly in its more 
extreme manifestations-primarily with the German conduct of warfare 
at sea. Very different in character were the measures upon which Great 
Britain and her allies relied in both World Wars for effecting the economic 
isolation of Germany. 55 
What is frequently referred to as the British" long-distance blockade" of 
Germany in World War I rested largely upon two Orders in Council that 
were expressly justified as measures of retaliation. In the first of these 
orders, issued March II, 1915, the declared intent was to prevent goods of 
52 Particularly enemy misconduct equally affecting belligerent and neutral rights at sea, but 
which neutral states are either unwilling or unable to prevent (see pp. 253-8). 
53 It was this feature-i. e., the attempt at total prohibition-that succeeded in arousing 
as much of the opposition to German was zones as the fact that these zones were partially 
enforced through the threat of destruction from submarines. On the other hand, the British 
war zone declarations were generally not total prohibitions, but the assertion of a right to 
control the movement of neutral traffic subject to the designation of lanes through which the 
mine fields could be passed in safety. The importance of this difference in the practice of the 
two states ought not to be underestimated. 
54 However, in reference to the British barred zones of World War II it has been stated that: 
''These developments tended in the direction of a successful assertion of the right of the bellig-
erent to lay mine-fields on the high seas irrespective of reprisals but subject to the duty to 
insure the relative safety of neutral uaffic." Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 683n (z). 
In practice, the difference between this opinion and the opinion expressed in the text above is 
not likely to prove very great. 
55 Very different in character not merely for the reason that they were much more effective 
than the German war zone declarations in cutting off neutral commerce, but for the far more 
important reason that they were applied without unlawfully endangering neutral lives. 
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any kind from reaching or leaving Germany.56 According to its terms no 
1nerchant vessel was to be permitted to proceed to or from Germany carrying 
goods destined to or laden in the ports of the enemy. Intercepted vessels · 
were subject to compulsory deviation to a British or Allied port and re-
quired to discharge cargo having an enemy origin or destination. In 
addition, 1ncrchant vessels t hough proceeding to or from neutral ports 
could nevertheless be intercepted and required to discharge such goods as 
were found to be of enemy origin, ownership, or destination. The dispo-
sition finally made of goods discharged in British or Allied ports varied, 
but in all instances not involving contraband (which, of course, was in any 
event liable to condemnation) it fell short of confiscation. Nor was any 
penalty attached to a vessel in respect to the carriage of goods found-
either upon calling voluntarily at an Allied port or upon being intercepted 
and escorted in to port-to be non-contraband in character. However, the 
severity of this earlier measure was increased by a later Order in Council of 
February 16, 1917, which, in addition to providing for the capture and con-
demnation of any vessel carrying goods with an enemy destination or of 
enemy origin, declared that any vessel "encountered at sea on her way to 
or from a port in any neutral country affording means of ~ccess to the enemy 
territory without calling at a port in British or Allied territory shall, until 
the contrary is established, be deemed to be carrying goods with an enemy 
destination, or of enemy origin, and shall be brought in for examination, 
and, if necessary, for adjudication before the Prize Court." 57 This pre-
sumption, which if not displaced resulted in condemnation of both vessel 
and cargo, could be avoided only by calling for examination at an appointed 
port. Even then, cargo found to be of enemy origin or destination was 
liable to condemnation. 
As retaliatory measures taken in response to Germany's unlawful conduct 
of submarine warfare these tvvo Orders need never have raised controversial 
questions relating to the scope of the belligerent right of blockade. Of 
course, the measures could be-and were-challenged by neutrals on the 
ground that reprisals taken by one belligerent against an enemy, for the 
alleged misconduct of the latter, could not be used as a basis for encroaching 
upon otherwise recognized neutral rights. In the absence of a lawful 
blockade it :was therefore held that neutral vessels carrying non-contraband 
cargo-whether neutral or enemy owned-must be considered exetnpt from 
belligerent interference. Apart from the question of reprisals; the latter 
56 The German decree of February 4, 1915, proclaiming the !Vaters around Great Britain a 
war zone in which enemy merchant vessels would be sunk without warning and neutral·vessels 
would enter only at grave peril, provided the basis for this retaliatory order. . 
57 Cited In Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 137-8. The justification given for the order of ' 
February 16, 1917 was declared to be the German war zone declaration of January 31, 1917, 
extending the area of previous war zones and applying measures of unrestricted submarine 
warfare to neutral vessels found within the prohibited zone. 
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contention was certainly supported by the tradi tionallaw.58 But this ad-
mission cannot be considered as necessarily relevant in determining the 
legality of belligerent measures which-though departing from normal 
rules regulating the actions permitted against neutral commerce-are taken 
in response to enemy misconduct directed agains t both belligerent and 
neutral, and which neutral states are either unwilling or unable to prevent. 
Despite the admitted hazards and possible abuse implicit in these measures 
it has been earlier submitted that, in principle, their. legitimacy may be 
upheld. 59 
On the other hand, it is a different question to ask whether the specific 
measures taken by Great Britain and her allies '\vere justified by reason of 
the circumstances in which they were invoked and in view of the attendant 
hardships they imposed upon neutrals. The fact that before the British 
Prize Court the retaliatory measures taken during World War I were con-
sidered to be legitimate acts of reprisals, 60 and not imposing unreasonable 
hardships upon rLeutrals, cannot of itself be regarded as conclusively 
establishing the legality of the measures under international law. In 
general, the status of retaliatory measures bearing adversely upon the 
normally recognized rights of neutrals is necessarily one of uncertainty. 61 
liB To this extent the reprisal measures went beyond the established law in the following 
respects. First, by ordering the detention-and finally the condemnation-of all goods having 
an enemy destination, even though not confiscable as contraband. In practice, the benefits 
received from this extension of belligerent right were not appreciable, considering the extent 
of belligerent contraband lists. Second, by ordering the detention-and finally the corrdemna-
tion-of all goods having an enemy origin. Apart from reprisal, there was no other warrant 
for such action, since the seizure of goods carried on neutral vessels and bearing an enemy origin 
was justified only in case of blockade. Third, the condem...'1ation of vessels-under the Order 
of February 16, 1917-for carrying goods of enemy destination or origin also went beyond the 
existing law, which provided for condemnation-in the absence of blockade-only in certain 
cases involving c2.rriage of contraband (see pp. 2.76-7). Fourth, in laying down-again under 
the Order of February 16, 1917-that a vessel bound to or from a neutral port providing means 
of access to an enemy would be presumed to be carrying goods of enemy destination or origin 
if failing to call at a British or Allied port for inspection of the cargo. The effect of this 
presumption, even though rebuttable, was to permit the seizure of vessels merely for the failure 
to call at a British or Allied port, and to place the burden of establishing innocence of the cargo 
upon the neutral claimant. On the other hand, the compulsory diversion of neutral vessels to 
British or Allied ports for inspection of the cargo-allowed under the Order of March II, 
1915-may be considered independently from these issues (see pp. 338-44). 
69 See PP· 2.56-8. 
60 As a means of reprisal, the legitimacy of the Order in Council of ~/larch II, 1915 was upheld 
in The Stigstad [1916], 5 Lloyds Prize Cases, p. 361; the Order of February 16, 1917 in The Leonora 
and Other Vessels [1919], 7 Lloyds Prize Cases, pp. 357-63. 
61 This is particularly so when the facts that are alleged to provide the basis for reprisal orders 
are themselves a matter of grave uncertainty. (And it should be noted once again that before 
the British Prize Court these facts are not made the subject of inquiry, the Court contenting 
itself to accept the statement of facts given by the Executive.) During World War I reprisal 
orders were based upon enemy acts that were, in turn, claimed to be retaliatory measures. Who 
initiated the endless series of reprisals by first resorting to unlawful behavior even now forms 
the subject of considerable controversy. 
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Probably for this reason Great Britain, though rejecting the neutral claim 
of immunity from the effects of belligerent "reprisal orders, .. was not 
unwilling to contend that in its operation at least the retaliatory system 
thus established did not depart from the essential principles demanded of 
a lawful blockade. 
On this basis 62 the principal objections made by the United States 
against the British ·'long-distance blockade' • were three in number. 63 The 
Order of March II, I9IS was enforced largely by the presence of a British 
cruiser squadron in the North Atlantic, operating some Iooo miles from 
German ports. From this vantage point the British \varships ':vere in a 
position not only to intercept vessels bound to and frotn German ports by 
way of the principal Atlantic trade routes, but also to intercept vessels 
bound to and from northern European neutral ports that provided access 
to Germany. At the same time, trade between these neutral ports and 
Germany-being ''inside'' the '' blockade''-remained open. In seizing 
vessels carrying goods suspected of having an ultimate enemy destination 
or origin, though bound at the time to or from a neutral port, it was con-
tended that the so-called "blockade" 1neasures thereby violated the prin-
ciple requiring that blockades not bar access to neutral ports. 64 Still 
further, it was noted that since the measures in question did not have the 
effect of intercepting trade carried on directly between Scandinavian and 
German Baltic ports they did not bear with equal severity upon all neutrals 
and therefore lacked an impartial character. Finally, and in close con-
nection with the preceding point, it was observed that in failing to close 
off trade between German and Scandinavian ports the" blockade" measures 
did not satisfy the requirement of effectiveness. 
In reply to these objections the British Government asserted that while 
the measures taken ought not to be judged by strict reference to the letter 
of the rules applicable to blockade, they were in substantial conformity 
with the spirit of these rules and should be regarded as a reasonable adap: 
62 I. e., on the basis of whether the retaliatory measures in question conformed to the essential 
principles governing lawful blockade. Needless to say, there could be no question of the 
fulfillment of the formal requirements of blockade (declaration or notification). 
63 The immediate and following paragraphs consist of a brief summary of the American notes 
of March 30, 1915 and October 2.r, 1915, as well as the British notes of July 2.3, 1915 and April 
2.4, 1916. Convenient texts may be found in A.]. I. L., 9 (1915), Spec. Supp., pp. u7, 157 and 
10 (1916) Spec. Supp., pp. 72., 134.-This controversy, it should be clearly understood, dealt 
only with the earlier order of March II, 1915, and the measures taken by Great Britain to carry 
it out. By the time of the second-and more stringent-Grder in Council of February 16, 1917 
the United States was on the verge of becoming a participant in the conflict, and with its 
entrance into hostilities the mainstay of neutral resistance collapsed. Similarly, in World· 
War II the British repri'\al order of July 30, 1940 came at a time when neutral resistance, though 
still appreciable, had begun to diminish in strength. These facts should be kept in mind when 
considering the possible significance of the British retaliatory systems on future developments. 
64 Though no objection was made either to the long distances maintaiped between the 
"blockading" force and German ports or to the fact thar the cruiser cordon was drawn across 
the sea approaches to neutral ports (seep. 2.9o). 
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tation of the latter to the peculiar circumstances in which the "blockade" 
of Germany had to be conducted. The charge that neutral ports were 
being blockaded was therefore denied by the contention that a belligerent 
did not violate any "fundamental principle of international law by applying 
a blockade in such a way as to cut off the enemy's commerce with foreign 
countries through neutral ports if the circumstances render such an appli-
cation of the principles of blockade the only means of making it effective." 
It was claimed that every effort was being made to distinguish between 
cargo consigned to neutral ports with a genuine neutral destination and 
goods ultimately destined to an ene1ny.65 As against· the charge that the 
"blockade" measures were partial in their application it was observed 
that "the passage of commerce to a blockaded area across a land frontier 
or across an inland sea has never been held to interfere with the effectiveness 
of the blockade. If the right to intercept commerce on its way to or from 
a belligerent country, even though it may enter that country through a 
neutral port, be granted, it is difficult to see why the interposition of a few 
miles of sea as well should make any difference. If the doctrine of con-
tinuous voyage may rightly be applied to goods going to Germany through 
Rotterdam, on what ground can it be contended that it is not equally 
applicable to goods with a similar destination passing through some 
Swedish port and across the Baltic or even through neutral waters only?'' 66 
65 To which the further argument was added that "we have tempered the severity with which 
our measures might press upon neutrals by not applying the rule which was invariable in the 
old form of blockade that ships and goods on their way to or from the blockaded area are liable 
to condemnation." This was quite true-at least until the Order of February r6, 1917-but 
could only serve to justify the measures in question as a legitimate reprisal (since not bearing 
too harshly upon neutrals), not as a legitimate blockade conducted in conformity with the 
customary law governing this belligerent measure. For that law, as earlier observed, per-
mitted the seizure of vessels (and cargoes) only if the latter were found to be destined to a 
blockaded port-whether directly or after touching at an intermediate neutral port. The claim 
that vessels could be seized for blockade breach on the grounds that the cargo carried was ulti-
mately destined to the blockaded area-the essence of the British position-simply could not 
be regarded as sanctioned by the customary law of blockade. Nor was this claim strengthened 
by the consider?tion that goods, upon reaching a neutral port, might be transshipped to another 
vessel and then pass through the forbidden area, since the decisive consideration was the 
ultimate destination of the vessel, not the cargo. That circumstances, as Great Britain pointed 
out, justified the extension of the concept of destination applicable in blockade to cargoes as 
well might be true (and, indeed, this position is subscribed to in the following pages). Never-
theless, this quite different consideration ought not to obscure the fact that the British position 
marked a departure from the strict letter of the traditional law. 
66 It is difficult to see the relevance of this reply to the charge of partiality, since instead of 
attempting to deal with this charge it makes the quite different point that the application of 
the doctrine of continuous voyage to blockade is justified. It was not disputed, however, that 
trade between Scandinavian and German ports was not being intercepted. Yet the order of 
March rr, 1915 purportedly applied to all neutral trade with all German ports. In this connec-
tion, Stone (op. cit., pp. 502.-3) declares-following a number of other writers-that the objec-
tion to the alleged partiality of the blockade was hardly critical, since "a blockade need not 
cover every approach to the blockaded port's coast. The fact that intra-Baltic traffic was 
beyond British reach seems to put the matter on no different basis; it was an objection to eco-
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Finally, it was claimed that as measured by actual results the "blockade" 
was extremely effective. 67 
As judged by the accepted practice of states during the period prior to 
World War I there was indeed little basis for contending that the "long 
distance blockade" of Germany in World War I conformed to the essential 
principles governing the traditional blockade. Nevertheless, it is a curious 
fact that while allegedly novel circumstances have been generally consid-
ered as justifying far-reaching changes in the law of contraband, the cir-
cumstances that admittedly render a close blockade either impossible, or 
largely futile even if possible, have still to be generally accepted as sanction-
ing similar changes in the law governing blockade. 68 Acceptance of the 
principle of ultimate enemy destination with respect to contraband has 
been accompanied by a pronounced reluctance to apply the same principle 
to blockade. Yet if in the case of contraband neutral territory is no longer 
nomic rather than naval effectiveness." But a blockade--at least according to the customary 
rules-must cover all the sea approaches to the ports or coasts declared under hlockade. This the British 
"long-distance blockade" did not-and could not-do. 
It should also be noted that the "impartiality" of the British "blockade" was open to 
question by reason of the large volume of British exports to Scandanavian and Netherlands 
ports. Although the United States did not press this point it did attach some significance to 
the fact that: "Great Britain exports and re-exports large quantities of merchandise to Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, whose ports, so far as American commerce is concerned, she .1 
regards as blockaded." Great Britain replied, in part, by pointing out that the volume of 
American exports to Northern Europe nevertheless showed a greater rate of increase than did 
British exports, and that American traders had made profits equal to or greater than the profits 
of British traders. This response was quite irrelevant from a legal point of view, since the 
traditional rules governing blockade required the blockading state to apply the blockade to 
its own trade as well as to the trade of neutrals. Of course, Great Britain could contend, and 
did contend, that British exports to neutral ports within the "blockaded" area were destined 
solely for neutral consumption, though there was at the time substantial question as to the 
validity of this contention. But even if true it did not do away with the charge that Great 
B~.itain was using the "blockade" in order to advance her commercial interests. 
67 With respect to the sea approaches in the North Atlantic, through which lines of controt , 
could be drawn, this was true enough. A different conclusion must be reached with respect to 
intra-Baltic traffic. Trade between Germany and the Scandinavian countries did of course 
decline as the war progressed. But this was due largely to Allied rationing policies imposed 
upon neutral states, which form little or no relation to the issues at controversy. 
68 Nor is it altogether relevant to argue that whereas by 1914 ample precedent existed for 
applying the principle of ultimate destination to contraband carriage there was very little--if 
any-authority for its application to blockade. Indeed, this contrast is itself misleading, since 
the application of this principle to contraband clearly hung by a very slender reed up to 1914. 
Despite the decisions of American prize courts during the Civil War, opposition to acceptance 
of the principle of ultimate enemy destination in any form remained very strong. And quite 
apart f~om this hostility, it will hardly be argued that these earlier decisions sanctioned the' 
remarkable application given the principle after 1914, in building up what amounted to a new 
law of contraband. Besides, if belligerent practice during the middle of the nineteenth century 
could introduce precedents of a far-reaching character why was the same attribute denied to ' 
belligerent practice a half century later? There is, in fact, no apparent reason for admitting legal 
change--in order to meet changed conditions--in the one case (contraband) and denying it 
in the other (blockade). 
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to be regarded as a safe emporium for goods 'vhose ultimate destination is 
to an enemy it is difficult to understand the continued insistence upon just 
this point in the case of blockade. 69 The exercise of contraband controls, 
labelled as such, can surely prove quite as effective in barring access to 
neutral ports as a blockade in which the principle of ultimate enemy destina-
tion is considered applicable to the offense of blockade breach. Still fur-
ther, the distinction between goods consigned to a neutral port, and h aving 
a genuinely neutral destination, and goods whose ultimate destination is 
to an enemy is just as possible (or perhaps more accurately: no more diffi-
cult) to make in the case of blockade as in the case of contraband. 70 
It is true that given the abandonment in recent hostilities of the distinc-
tion between absolute and conditional contraband, and the gradual dis-
69 One of the best arguments to this effect remains J. W. Garner's International Law and the 
World War (192.o), Vol. II, pp. 32.7 ff. Also H. W. Malkin, "Blockade in Modern Conditions," 
B. Y. I. L., (!92.2.-2.3), pp. 87-98. And Hyde (op. cit., p. 2.199) writes that: "If the doctrine 
of continuous voyage may be fairly applied to a neutral ship ostensibly bound for a neutral port 
solely because of the fact that the vessel is ultimately bound for a blockaded enemy port, 
does it follow that non-contraband neutral cargoes may be likewise seized when bound for 
neutral ports, if further transportation by land or sea to the territory of the belligerent whose 
coast is blockaded is in reality sought to be effected? It is believed to be difficult to find a 
convincing negative answer, although it may be maintained with assurance that maritime 
states had not yielded so broad a right when World War I was initiated.' '-A limited concession 
to the application of the principle of ultimate enemy destination to blockade may be found in 
the position (which now en joys a certain support from states, see p. 3 I6) that the doctrine 
of continuous voyage may apply to blockade where both laps of the voyage are by sea and the 
goods (though not necessarily the vessel) are intended to reach the blockaded area by way of 
the forbidden route. But on this view goods intended, after reaching a neutral port, to be 
forwarded to the blockaded area by a route (land or inland waterway) that does not involve 
crossing the "lines of blockade" are exempt from seizure for blockade breach. The difficulty 
with this view is that while it does not follow the customary law, which fastened attention 
upon the final destination of the vessel and not of the goods, it fails to resolve the problem of 
destination given the conditions under which blockade normally must now be conducted. 
For it would fail to apply to goods destined to or originating from a blockaded area other than 
by way of the forbidden route. This in itself could render a blockade largely futile in modern 
conditions. Furthermore, in the case of blockades maintained at great distances from an enemy's 
coasts the blockade runner-in a sense-passes through the "lines" of the blockading forces 
on his way to a neutral port. Once in the neutral port the vessel might then sail for an enemy 
port without-in a strict sense-again passing through the forbidden area. These considera-
tions suggest the difficulties involved in attempting to apply the traditional law in modern 
conditions. They also imply that a partial modification of the customary law governing 
destination in the case of blockade may prove to be no solution at all. 
70 Undoubtedly it is this consideration that has been a primary factor in the opposition to 
applying, in the case of blockade, the principle of ultimate enemy destination to cargoes as 
well as to vessels. In brief, the argument has been that once the destination of the ship is 
no longer conclusive in determining the destination of the cargo-as it is under the traditional 
rules governing breach of blockade-the way is opened to mere opinion and conjecture. In 
this process, it is contended, goods with a genuine neutral destination are seized and belliger-
ents are left free to interfere with innocent neutral traffic. At the same time, it will hardly 
be denied that the conjecture that would admittedly accompany this application of the prin-
ciple of ultimate enemy destination to blockade breach already characterizes the procedure 
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appearance of the category of free goods, the practical difference benveen 
contraband and blockade controls cannot be very great so far as enemy 
imports are concerned. 71 One important difference must necessarily remain, , 
however, since seizure for carriage of contraband can apply only to goods 
having an enemy destination, whereas seizure for blockade breach may 
apply equally to exports from the blockaded area. Even so, the application 
of what has been termed the principle of ultimate enemy origin appears no 
less justified in the case of blockade than does the principle of ultimate 
enemy destination when applied to the carriage of contraband. 72 
In any event, World War II witnessed a repetition-though not without 
certain significant modifications-of the "blockade" measures adopted in 
the preceding conflict, and once again the legal basis fat these measures was 
asserted to be the right of retaliation against the enemy's misconduct. 
Thus in response to what were alleged to be illegal German acts of sub- · 
marine and mine warfare, an Order in Council of November 2.7, 1939 pro-
vided that any vessel sailing from a German port, or a port in territory 
under enemy occupation, after December 4, 1939 might be intercepted and 
required to discharge in a British or Allied port that part of its cargo as 
was laden in an enemy port. Vessels sailing from non-enemy ports and 
found to be carrying goods of enemy origin or ownership might also be 
required to discharge such goods in a British or Allied port. The disposi-
tion to be made of goods so discharged and placed in the custody of the 
marshal of the prize court varied, but-in principle-these goods could 
either be requisitioned by the government or sold under direction of the 
prize court with proceeds of Lhe sale to be paid to the owners after the 
conclusion of peace under circumstances the court considered just. 73 
for determining destination in the case of contraband carriage. The unfortunate truth is that 
such conjecture is an inevitable result of the acceptance of the principle of ultimate enemy 
destination in any form. To say this, however, is not to justify the belligerent attempt to 
attach a legal liability to seizure of vessels and cargoes that have failed to obtain belligerent 
clearance prior to departure from neutral ports-a matter to be dealt with shortly. 
71 Assuming, of course, that the principle ot ultimate enemy destination is applicable to both. 
72 And experience indicates that there is less uncertainty-and less conjecture-involved in 
the attempt to determine the enemy origin of goods than in determining enemy destination. 
73 The text of the November 2.7th Order in Council, with later changes, is given in Hack-
worth, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. I 38-40. (A French decree of November 2.8th substantially followed 
the British Order). A detailed account of the events leading up to the November 2.7th Order, 
as well as its operation, is given by Medlicott, op. cit., pp. n2.-2.4. Considerable n~utral protest 
was raised against the measure, and numerous modifications were made to its operation. The 
measure was administered mainly by use of "certificates of origin and interest." These certifi-
cates, as Medlicott points out, ''were issued in the form of a statement by the consular officer' 
at the port of loading that he was satisfied that the merchandise in question had nor been 
produced in enemy territory, and that no enemy person or firm, or firm on the Statutory list, 
had any interest in it. Separate certificates were required for each consignment, exc;ept in 
certain exceptional circumstances .... " Vessels outward bound from adjacent neutral ports 
were allowed to proceed if carrying cargoes covered by export passes. Vessels carrying cargoes 
not so covered were diverted to a contraband control base where a period of detention fol-
lowed and inquiry was made into the origin and ownership of the goods. 
312 
The Order of November 2.7th served only as a prelude, however, to the 
later Order in Council of July 3 I, 1940. The relevant provisions of this 
. later retaliatory Order read as follows: 
2.. Any vessel on her way to or from a port through which goods 
might reach or come from enemy territory or the enemy armed 
forces, not being provided with a Ship Navicert valid for the voy-
age on which she is engaged, shall, until the contrary is estab-
lished, be deemed to be carrying contraband or goods of enemy 
origin or ownership, and shall be liable to seizure as Prize; pro-
vided that a vessel, other than a vessel which sailed from or has 
called at an enemy port, shall not be liable to seizure under the 
provisions of this Article unless she sailed from or could have 
called at a port at which she would, if duly qualified, have ob-
tained a Ship Navicert. 
3. (I) Goods consigned to any port or place from which they 
might reach enemy territory or the enemy armed forces, and not 
covered by a valid Cargo Navicert or, in the case of goods shipped 
from a British or Allied port, by a valid Export or Transshiptnent 
Licence, where such Licence is required, shall, until the contrary is 
established, be deemed to have an enemy destination. 
(2.) Goods shipped from any port from which goods of 
enemy origin or ownership might have been shipped, and not 
covered by a valid Certificate of Origin and Interest, shall, until 
the contrary is established, be deemed to be of enemy origin or 
ownership. 
4· Goods of enemy origin or ownership shall be liable to con-
demnation. 
5. Any vessel seized under Article 2. hereof and carrying contra-
band or goods of enemy origin or ownership shall be liable to 
condemnation in respect of such carriage. 74 
74 Statutory Rules and Orders, 1940, No. 1436. In the Preamble to the Order it was declared 
that .. for the convenience of traders and for the avoidance of risks and delays inseparable from 
the diversion of ships into port in the exercise of belligerent rights against commerce at sea, a 
system has been instituted whereby passes can be obtained for approved cargoes and for ships 
which carry none but approved cargoes.'' Paragraph I of the Order contained the following 
definitions: 
.. the term 'Cargo Navicert' means a pass issuable by the appropriate British or Allied 
authority in the neutral country of shipment in respect of goods consigned to any port or 
place from which they might reach the enemy, to the effect that, so far as is known at the 
date of issue, there is no objection to the consignment . . . 
"the term 'Certificate of Origin and Interest' means a pass issuable by the appropriate British 
or Allied authority in the neutral country 
"The term 'Ship Navicert' means a pass issuable to a vesselinrespectofa given voyage by 
the appropriate British or Allied authority at all British, Allied or neutral ports, if that 
authority is satisfied that the vessel is duly qualified to receive it." 
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The principle, and novel, feature of the system of control thus intro-
duced 75 may be found in the consequences attending the failure on the part 
of neutrals to obtain the belligerent's prior approval for voyages under-
taken, and cargo shipped, to or from any port providing access to the 
enemy. By the terms of the Order liability to seizure was-in any event-
justified when a vessel failed to carry a Ship Navicert or goods were not 
fully covered by Cargo Navicerts or Certificates of Origin and Interest. 
The presumptions held to arise as a result of such failure were sufficient-if 
not clearly rebutted-to warrant condemnation either of vessel or of cargo 
or of both. To these legal liabilities were added measures the exercise of 
which demanded no legal justification but whose effect in inducing neutral 
shipowners and traders to participate in the Allied control system was 
nevertheless very considerable. Thus the refusal on the part of neutral 
shipowners to undertake full compliance with Allied regulations entailed , 
the deprivation of access to all British controlled facilities, e. g., bunkers, 
drydocking, repairing and insurance. 76 
75 The background of the Order of July 31, 1940 deserves a few words. By July 1940, German 
conquests in Europe had rendered almost unworkable the system of contraband and enemy 
export controls heretofore exercised. Instead of patrolling only the supply routes leading to 
and from the principal ports of once adjacent neutrals, measures were now required to maintain 
close and direct control over practically the whole of the European coastline. To attempt this 
task through the use of naval patrols-which would continue to intercept neutral vessels-was 
evidently impossible in view of the coastline to be patrolled and the vessels of the Royal Navy 
available. Medlicott (op. cit., pp. 416-7) has pointed out that even before the defeat of France 
"a complete naval blockade of German Europe was impossible ... The result ... was that 
a great extension of control at source. , .. became imperative. The naval blockade-the actual 
interception of blockade runners by ships of the Royal Navy-had, in other words, to be supple· 
mented and, as far as possible, replaced by export control in all overseas territories from which 
these supplies could reach Europe." In brief, the former threat of interception and detention 
had to be replaced by other deterrents which would prove even more effective. 
76 A clear and detailed picture of the system of controls emerging from the Order of July 31, 
1940 is given by Medlicott, op. cit., pp. 42.2.-62.. In principle, this system rested upon three• 
devices: compulsory navicerting, "ships warrants," and the rationing of neutrals. The nature 
of the first measure had already been indicated. "Ships warrants" were documents issued to 
each vessel whose owner agreed to comply with British regulations. In the absence of this 
document none of the British controlled facilities would be made available to the vessel. In 
addition, if even one vessel attempted to evade these regulations by carrying unnavicerted 
cargo all ships belonging to the same line might be denied a ship warrant. The rationing of 
neutrals implied the fixing of import quotas to be allowed neutral states, which were supposedly 
adequate for domestic consumption though not for re-export. The close interdependence of 
these three devices is made clear by Medlicott in the following passage: ''The withholding of 
access to British-controlled facilities throughout the world supplied ... an effective means 
of inducing neutral shipowners to compel traders to make the applications for navicerts which 
constituted the so-called compulsory system. It is also true that die compulsory navicert system 
was necessary to the success of the ship-warrant scheme. The scheme as a blockade weapon 
could be of full value only where there was machinery for the approval of cargoes and voyages, 
that is, where the navicert system was in operation. The success of the government's plans for 
the general control of neutral shipping in the interests of the Allies likewise depended to a 
considerable extent on the control of cargoes and the rationing of neutrals • • • as this would 
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In design, therefore, as in actual effect, the Order of .July 31, 1940 imposed 
an almost complete control over neutral commerce, and did so by methods 
that bore little resemblance to the traditional law. Provided that neutrals 
submitted to this system of control, it is true that the Order made possible 
the avoidance of the risks and delays attendant upon the diversion of 
vessels into ports. This fact may be of relevance in judging the legitimacy 
of the Order as a measure of retaliation, but apart from retaliation the legal 
relevance of these ''concessions·· to neutral convenience must be doubted. 
Nonnally, a belligerent has no right to regulate neutral trade through the 
device of subjecting this trade to a legaL liability to seizure merely for the 
reason that the neutral trader has not obtained the belligerent's prior 
approval. 77 Nor may neutrals safely expect that an enemy will fail to 
treat such compliance with one belligerent's regulations-even though 
made'' compulsory''-as an act of unneutral service. 78 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
The difficulties that frequently have been noted elsewhere in this study 
when attempting to evaluate the effect of recent belligerent practice upon 
the traditional law appear even more pronounced in the case of blockade. 
enable the Ministry of Shipping to forecast accurately the amount of shipping required for 
the trade of a particular neutral. The rationing of the imports of adjacent neutrals was, in 
turn, almost indispensable as a basis for the compulsory navicert arrangements," (pp. 431-2.). 
It may be noted that up to this point not only had navicerts been ··voluntary" in character-
insofar as their absence was no cause for seizure-but that neutral rationing had been attempted 
either by voluntary agreements (war trade agreements) with neutral states or by agreement 
with neutral shipping lines. 
77 In the case of the Order of July 31, 1940, the legal liability imposed was-as already noted-
a liability to seizure and to eventual condemnation if the presumptions thus held to arise were 
not successfully rebutted. Sir G. G. Fitzmaurice (op. cit., p. 87) points out that the Order 
""did not (and clearly could not), any more than was previously the case, compel shippers to 
take out navicerts as a precondicion of effecting shipment. There was still no legal bar to 
shipment without a navicert ... The real changes effected by it were, it would seem, that 
for the first time a legal liability to seizure was created, arising from the mere fact of the absence 
of a navicert, coupled with a legal presumption (u~less and until rebutted) that unnavicerted 
goods had an enemy destination." Buc it is difficult to see why Fitzmaurice insists that shippers 
were not "'compelled" to take out navicerts or why he cavils against describing the Order as 
establishing a ··compulsory" navicert system. Admittedly, condemnation did not follow 
from the mere fact of the absence of a navicert, and in this particular sense the Order was not 
compulsory. But it is only in this sense true. From the point of view of subjecting unnavi-
certed vessels and cargoes to seizure-with a legal presumption of enemy destination-it cer-
tainly was compulsory. Besides, as a measure of reprisal the very purpose of the Order was, 
as Fitzmaurice himself points out, ·"to enlarge the normal legal powers of the Crown in the 
matter of effecting seizures and obtaining condemnations, for otherwise there would have been 
no point in it."-Gn the other hand, the opinion of S. W. D. Rowson,("'PrizeLawDuringthe 
Second World War," pp. 196-7 ), that the Order merely contains rules of a "procedural character" 
which are within the scope of a belligerent's normal legal powers, hardly seems acceptable. 
78 See pp. 32.2.-3 for a brief comment on the navicert system-both in its voluntary and com-
pulsory forms-in relation to unneutral service. 
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Undoubtedly, the principal reason for this added difficulty may be attributed 
to the almost uniform insistence of belligerents in justifying as reprisals 
measures designed to accomplish the purpose of blockade-as presently · 
conceived-though without conforming to the traditional rules governing 
this belligerent measure. 79 In consequence, there is room for asserting 
that from the standpoint of a formal legal analysis it is unnecessary to go 
beyond an examination of the legitimacy of the measures reviewed in 
preceding pages, as measures of reprisal.,· that whatever judgment is made 
concerning the legitimacy of these measures, as measures of reprisal, it 
cannot affect the continued validity of the law governing blockade. If 
this position is adopted it would appear that the traditional law remains-
on the whole-unchanged, with perhaps the one exception that breach of 
blockade may now be considered as extending to instances where either 
vessel or cargo is destined ultimately to a blockaded port (though imme-
diately bound for a neutral port at the time of visit) by a route that requires 
passing through the blockaded area. 80 
At the satne time, acceptance of this view entails at least the admission 
that in the circumstances characterizing recent naval hostilities the tradi-
tional blockade, and therefore a number of the rules governing its opera-
tion, have become largely irrelevant. H, however, recent belligerent prac-
tice is looked upon as a thinly veiled endeavor to replace the traditional 
law through the instrument of reprisals, and this would seem to represent 
the more realistic view, then the question of legal change must be squarely 
faced. It has already been pointed out that if the principle of ultimate 
79 In this connection note may be taken of the fact that, in contrast to World VI ar I, there was 
no repeated attempt made by Great Britain in 1939 and 1940 to provide further justification for 
the reprisal measures taken against Germany by contending that the latter conformed, in 
substance at least if not in form, to the rules laid down for the traditional blockade. It would 
appear that one of the major reasons for this silence was the absence of firm protest against the , 
British reprisal measures on the part of the United States. 
so See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 632.g (3). It will be apparent that the formulation 
presented above does not imply an unqualified application to blockade of the principle of ulti-
mate enemy destination. On the contrary, it is only when vessel or cargo are destined to reach 
a blockaded port by way of the forbidden route that breach of blockade may arise. It would 
not apply, however, to goods ultimately destined to enemy territory under blockade if the 
goods are to reach their destination by a route that would not involve crossing the "lines of 
blockade." The difficulties that could easily arise in applying this qualified extension of the 
principle of ultimate enemy destination to blockade have already been noted (seep. 3u (n)). 
Nevertheless, it is not altogether clear that states have accepted even this limited change. 
Despite the assertion of Colombos (op. cit., p. 2.56) and Stone (op. cit., p. 498), that applica- ' 
tion of continuous voyage to blockade may now be considered- an established principle of 
international law, there remains some question as to the general acceptance of this limited 
application of the principle with respect to cargoes, since the official position of a majority of 
naval powers has stopped short of a clear and unequivocal endorsement. Nor is it likely .that 
there will be any :Htempt toward clarification, in view of recent developments in the law of 
contraband and the ready use that may be made of the instrument of reprisals in order to render 
enemy exports liable to seizure. 
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enemy destination is applicable to contraband there is no apparent reason 
for continuing to deny its unqualified application to blockade. On this 
basis, the further admission of the principle of ultimate enemy origin to 
blockade would appear as a necessary corollary. 81 Nevertheless, it would 
still remain necessary to insist that there is no warrant for asserting that 
other criteria used in determining the lawfulness of blockade measures have 
lost their validity. Blockades, in order to be binding, would still have to 
be effectively maintained, and the element of danger associated with an 
effective blockade would still have to be understood in terms of a liability 
to seizure-not to destruction upon entrance into the forbidden area. 82 
81 The substance of this change, if endorsed, would involve the acceptance of the British 
reprisal measures of March 1915 and November 1939 (though not the measures of February 1917 
and August 1940)-at least to the extent these measures implied the desirability of extending 
the principles of ultimate enemy destination and origin to blockades which are otherwise 
conducted in conformity with the traditional rules. 
82 Thus a belligerent could not argue that the· necessity for patrolling vast areas of the high 
seas thereby excused him from meeting the traditional requirement of effectiveness. Nor could 
a belligerent-apart from reprisal-impose upon neutral vessels a liability to seizure and-
possibly-to condemnation, unless neutral traders submitted to a system of control which 
thereby permitted the belligerent to ease his burden of assigning large surface forces to the task 
of intercepting blockade runners. The British reprisal Order of July 31, 1940 would still have 
to find its justification as a reprisal. Certainly, when judged by the traditional law it could 
have no other justification than as a reprisal. 
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